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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Voting Rights Act, initially adopted in 1965 and extended in 1970, 1975,
and 1982,' is considered one of the most successful pieces of civil rights legislation
ever adopted by the United States Congress.2 The Act's principal target in 1965
was seven southern states, where only one in three African Americans of voting age

were on the voting rolls, as compared with more than two of every three whites.
Two decades later, almost two out of every three blacks were registered in those
states, not far below the level for whites.4 Virtually excluded from all public offices

1. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb- 1(2000)); Act of August 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73,
89 Stat. 400; Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314; Voting Rights
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
2. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 640 (1993); S. REP. No. 97-417, at 111 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,282; Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1359, 1360

(1995) (reviewing QUIET REVOLUTION

IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OFTHE VOTING RIGHTS ACT,

1965-

1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994)); see Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 92728 (1995); Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN
MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 7, 7 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler
Davidson eds., 1992); Hugh Davis Graham, Voting Rights and the American Regulatory State, in
CONTROVERSIES, supra, at 177; Thomas E. Mann, Preface to CONTROVERSIES, supra, at xiii.
3. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVILRIGHTS, POLITICALPARTICIPATION 222-23 app. VII, tbl. 1(1968). The
Act applied to six Southern states-Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and
Virginia-and in 40 counties in North Carolina. Id. at ii.
4. See id. at 222-23 app. VII, tbl.1 (1968) (showing Pre-Act and Post-Act registration for whites
and nonwhites). Prior to the Voting Rights Act's enactment, thirty-five percent of eligible nonwhites
and seventy-three percent of whites were registered. Id; cf HAROLD W. STANLEY, VOTER
MOBILIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF RACE: THE SOUTH AND UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE, 1952- 1984, at 97
tbl. 15 (1987) (reporting a slightly higher figure of forty-three percent of eligible blacks registered in

1964 and sixty-six percent registered in 1984). The percentage of eligible blacks registered in 1964
varied from seven percent in Mississippi to forty-seven percent in North Carolina. Id. By 1984, the
range had narrowed from fifty-eight percent in Georgia to seventy-four percent in Alabama. Id.
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in the South in 1965, blacks in those states made up nine percent of all state
representatives and eight percent of all state senators by 1990, and approximately
six percent of the members of local governing bodies.'
Few policies are self-effectuating. Federal court decisions, congressional
oversight, and periodic revision shaped the implementation of the Act. The words
of the statute and the evolution of voting rights case law guided the Civil Rights
Division of the Department of Justice, the federal agency charged with enforcing

key provisions of the Act. This Article explains how the Voting Rights Act has
worked in the four decades since its adoption in 1965, assesses its impact on
minority voting and representation in the South, and explains the process of
implementation responsible for the Act's success.6
II.

THE POLICIES SET FORTH IN THE STATUTE

Before the Act's adoption in 1965, only lawsuits brought under the
Reconstruction Amendments afforded legal protection for minority voting rights in
the South.7 The Civil Rights Act of 1957 created a Civil Rights Division in the
Department of Justice and gave it authority to bring constitutional challenges to

barriers on minority voting. 8 Frustration with the slow progress of the Department's
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction campaign before often hostile Southern courts, however,
fueled demands by civil rights groups and their congressional supporters for a

strong voting rights law.9
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 departed from precedent by providing for direct

federal action to enable African Americans in the South to register and vote.
Section 4 suspended, initially for only five years, the use of literacy tests as a
prerequisite to voting."1 To counter the broad discretion previously exercised by
5. See QUIET REvOLUTION, supranote 2, at 66 tbl.2.10, 102 tbl.3.10, 134 tbl.4.10, 154 tbl.5.10,
190 tbl.6.10, 232 tbl.7.10, 298 tbl.9.10, 345 tbl.l 1.1.
6. My use of the terms "implementation" and "impact" is consistent with the conventional

meaning of these terms. See, for example, EUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT
HAPPENS AFTER A BILL BECOMES A LAW 36-38 (Jeffrey Pressman & Martha Weinberg eds., 1977);
Paul Sabatier & Daniel Mazmanian, The Implementation of Public Policy: A FrameworkofAnalysis,
8 POL'Y STUD. J. 538, 540-41 (1980); and Donald S. Van Meter & Carl E. Van Horn, The Policy
Implementation Process:A Conceptual Framework, 6 ADMIN. & SOC'Y 455, 477-79 (1975).
7. See Warren M. Christopher, The Constitutionalityof the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1965) (discussing the failure of the Reconstruction legislation to adequately address and
provide remedies for discriminatory election practices).
8. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, §§ 101-104, 71 Stat. 634, 634-36; see
Christopher, supra note 7, at 4 (analyzing the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and its effects); Armand
Derfner, Racial Discriminationand the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 546-47 (1973) ("The
Act created a Commission on Civil Rights, and upgraded the Civil Rights Section to a division of the
Justice Department.").
9. See DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, at 12-14,35-39 (1978); STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS
IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969, at 206-12, 220-22 (1976).
10. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4, 798 Stat. 437, 438-39.
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local registrars and poll officials, other provisions authorized federal examiners to

register persons in designated counties and permitted federal observers to monitor
the conduct of elections." The Act also required the Department of Justice to file

lawsuits challenging poll tax requirements in states where the poll tax appeared be
used to to deter minority voting. 2
The most novel feature of the Act-and, to those concerned with the operation

of our federal system, the most intrusive-was the preclearance requirement set
forth in Section 5.13 Here, too, the statute blended judicial enforcement with
administrative implementation. Under the terms of Section 5, a federal factfinder-either a panel of three federal judges or the U.S. Attorney General-has to
preclear all changes to "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,

practice, or procedure with respect to voting" before that voting practice could take
effect. 14 Administrative preclearance by the Department of Justice has proven far

speedier and less costly than judicial preclearance, and jurisdictions have almost
always preferred administrative over judicial preclearance.15
In 1966, the Supreme Court ruled the preclearance requirement, like other
challenged provisions of the Act, was constitutional. 6 Whenever the Department
of Justice obtained favorable decisions striking down particular tests, southern states
simply enacted new discriminatory devices.17 As the Court stated, "Congress had

reason to suppose that these States might try similar maneuvers in the future in
order to evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act itself."' 8
III.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ENFRANCHISEMENT

In the first three years, the Department of Justice's implementation of the Act
focused on removing barriers to registration and voting.' 9 The Attorney General
dispatched federal examiners to register blacks and sent federal observers to

11. Id. §§ 3, 6-9.
12. Davidson, supra note 2, at 20.
13. For a criticism of the intrusive nature of the preclearance provisions of the Act, see ABIGAIL
THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT: AFFIRMATIVE AcTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 26,38,
157-58, 162 (1987).
14. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. 1973c (2000).
15. See Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 503 (1977) (examining the speed of the administrative
method); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 549 (1969) (discussing rapid administrative
systems); GARROW, supra note 9, at 198; see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
315-18, 334-35 (1966) (criticizing labor-intensive litigation).
16. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308. "Congress concluded that the unsuccessful remedies which it
had prescribed in the past would have to be replaced by sterner and more elaborate measures .. " Id.
at 309.
17. Id. at 314.
18. Id. at 335.
19. See QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 47.
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monitor elections in counties that had a record of obstruction and discrimination.2 °
Although the Attorney General only used examiners in approximately 60 counties, 2'
the threat that they might be dispatched-coupled with other provisions of the Act
that provided criminal penalties for interfering with voters' efforts to cast their
ballots-reportedly convinced officials throughout the region to permit relatively
free registration and voting by most blacks.22 Initially, however, the Department of
Justice had to go to court to prevent state court judges from blocking the work of
federal examiners and private voter registration activists .23 The federal courts also
struck down the poll tax in four states that still used it as a prerequisite to voting in
state elections. 24 The Department of Justice also interposed Section 5 objections to
various changes in state law or local practices that had the potential for restricting
access to the ballot.2 5
The combination of administrative and judicial
implementation brought a dramatic increase in voter registration among both black
and white Southerners.2 6 Thus, the Act indisputably accomplished its initial
goal-universal suffrage.

IV. THE COURT CONFRONTS MINORITY VOTE DILUTION
Faced with the prospect that black voters might cast a majority of the ballots in

some single-member districts, southern legislatures, both before and after adoption
of the Act, often shifted to at-large election systems, numbered place or runoff

20. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 153-62; see also LAWSON, supra note
9, at 329-339 (discussing the effect of federal examiners on elections); Richard Scher & James Button,
Voting Rights Act: Implementationand Impact, in IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS POLIcY 20, 30
(Charles S. Bullock, II & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1984) (asserting "the most important initial aspect
of federal intervention into the electoral process under the Voting Rights Act was the federal examiner
and observer programs").
21. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 154; GARROW, supra note 9, at 190;
Scher & Button, supra note 20, at 32.
22. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 162 (discussing the criminal remedies
established as part of the Voting Rights Act); Scher & Button, supra note 20, at 32 ("[T]he credible
threat of a federal presence seemed to prompt many county authorities to register citizens fairly in order
to avoid such intrusions into their affairs."); cf GARROW, supra note 9, at 181 ("Justice Department
officials made it clear.., that their goal would be to achieve as much voluntary compliance with the
act's commands by local registrars as possible in an effort to minimize the number of examiners sent
South."); LAWSON, supra note 9, at 334 ("[T]he presence of federal registrars in nearby locales perhaps
prompted the county authorities to carry out the law faithfully, thus averting a similar intrusion into
their domains.").
23. See U. S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 162-65; Peyton McCrary et al.,
Alabama, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 2, 39, 52.
24. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 166-67; see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-67 (1966) (finding a poll tax an unconstitutional voting barrier in state
elections). Payment of the poll tax as a prerequisite for voting in federal elections had previously been
eliminated by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
25. See Scher & Button, supra note 20, at 33-37.
26. See STANLEY, supra note 4, at 94-99 (noting the difficulty of identifying a precise statistical
measure of the impact of the Act on registration or turnout).
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requirements, or gerrymandered district lines to minimize the number of blackmajority districts.2 7 Voting rights lawyers were able to challenge the use of these
devices because in early 1965, the Supreme Court, in Fortson v. Dorsey, z8
suggested that minority vote dilution was justiciable in a Georgia challenge to atlarge elections.29 In 1966, Fred Gray, the African American lawyer who six years
earlier in Gomillion v. Lightfoot30 successfully challenged racial gerrymandering in
Alabama, brought the first minority vote-dilution case.3 Gray attacked the adoption
of at-large elections for the Democratic Executive Committee of Barbour County,
Alabama.32 Judge Frank Johnson ruled that because black voters comprised a
majority of those registered in some districts, but not in the county as a whole, the
bloc votes of the white majority would dilute minority voting strength in a countywide election.33 He also found that the change was motivated by a racially
discriminatory purpose and thus violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.34
Not all federal judges were as willing to protect the rights of minority voters as
Alabama's Frank Johnson. For this reason, African American plaintiffs sought to
persuade the courts that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act required preclearance
for changes that would potentially dilute minority voting strength and notjust those
affecting the right to register and cast a ballot.35 The effort focused on Mississippi
legislation that authorized a shift from single-member districts to at-large elections
for county boards of supervisors and boards of education because, as one state

27. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 21-39; GARROW, supra note 9, at
202-206; Derfner, supra note 8, at 552-58. Use of at-large elections was the cornerstone of this new
legislative program for maintaining white control. Political scientists had long understood that citywide or county-wide elections enable a white majority, if it votes as a cohesive bloc, to prevent a racial
minority from electing representatives of its choice. See generally EDWARD C. BANFIELD & JAMES Q.
WILSON, CITY PoLmcs 87-96,307-309 (1963) (contrasting voting systems and subsequent effects on
black candidates); EVERETT CARLL LADD, JR., NEGRO POLITIcAL LEADERSHIP IN THE SOUTH 29-30,
102-03, 306-07 (1966) (discussing election of black candidates); DONALD R. MArrTHEWS & JAMES W.
PROTHRO, NEGROES AND THE NEW SOUTHERN POLmics 4-5,143-44,208,220-21 (1966) (recounting
effects of at-large systems).
28. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
29. Id. at 438-39. For an examination of the evidence of racial vote dilution that could have been
placed on the record in Fortson, see Peyton McCrary & Steven F. Lawson, Race and Reapportionment,
1962: The Case of Georgia Senate Redistricting, 12 J. POL' YHIST. 293 (2000).
30. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
31. Smith v. Paris, 257 F. Supp 901 (M.D. Ala. 1966), modified andaff'd,386 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.
1967). For another discussion of malapportionment and racially-based voting dilution, see Sims v.
Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965), which applied the "one-man, one-vote" standard from
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
32. Paris,257 F. Supp. at 902. Barbour County was George Wallace's home county.
33. Id. at 904.
34. Id. Judge Johnson wrote that the change was "born of an effort to frustrate and discriminate
against Negroes in the exercise of their right to vote." Id. For a more complete account, see Peyton
McCrary et al., Alabama, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 39-41, 399-400.
35. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 23 n.18.
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senator stated, "countywide balloting will safeguard 'a white board [of supervisors]
and preserve our way of doing business. '36
In 1969, the Supreme Court ruled in Allen v. State Board of Elections37 that the

Mississippi law, like all other voting changes adopted in covered jurisdictions, must
be submitted either to the U. S. Attorney General or to a three-judge district court
in the District of Columbia for preclearance." The Court noted that a change from
district to at-large voting for county supervisors could have a discriminatory effect
because "[v]oters who are members of a racial minority might well be in the
majority in one district, but in a decided minority in the county as a whole."'3 9
Under those circumstances, at-large elections could, if voting patterns followed
racial lines, "nullify their ability to elect the candidate of their choice just as would
prohibiting some of them from voting."4 ° Allen, by expanding the concept of vote
dilution from the quantitative(one-person, one-vote) context to include qualitative

(racial) vote dilution, shaped enforcement of the Voting Rights Act for the next
quarter century.4 1

Even conservative commentator Abigail Thernstrom-who is sharply critical
of the preclearance requirement on theoretical grounds-concedes the Mississippi

laws at issue in Allen were racially disciminatory in both intent and effect.42 Yet she
argues that the Allen decision improperly extended the Voting Rights Act beyond

the intent of the original framers, which was merely to protect the right of minority
voters "to enter a polling booth and pull the lever.

'43

The primary concern of the

framers of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 was, understandably, to protect the right
of black voters to register and cast a ballot. During the hearings, however, Attorney

General Nicholas Katzenbach and House members explicitly referred to the racial
gerrymander struck down by the Supreme Court a few years earlier in Gomillion v.

36. See Billy Skelton, EastlandSees Change In Wind With New 'Rights' Legislation, JACKSON
CLARION-LEDGER (Miss.), May 18, 1966, at 1; FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL
EMPOWERMENT IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965, at 54 (1990). For a detailed account of the efforts of the
1966 Mississippi legislature's attempt to minimize the effects of the Act, see PARKER, supra, at 34-66.
37. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
38. Id. at 563.
39. Id. at 569.
40. Id. The Allen Court also cited the Alabama reapportionment case, Reynolds v. Sims, for the
proposition at the heart of the Court's expansive interpretation of the Voting Rights Act: "The right
to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting
a ballot." Id. (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
41. See generally Peyton McCrary, Bringing Equality to Power: How the Federal Courts
Transformed the Electoral Structure of Southern Politics, 1960-1990, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665
(2003) (analyzing the change in the structure of southern politics because of protections against
quantitative and qualitative vote dilution).
42. THERNSTROM, supra note 13, at 24-27. "Clearly the Court could not stand by while southern
whites in covered states-states with dirty hands on questions of race-altered electoral rules to
buttress white hegemony." Id. at 4.
43. Id. at 5. The concurrence by Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia in Holder v. Hall,
512 U.S. 874, 891-946 (1994) (Thomas, J. concurring) reflects Thernstrom's view that the Supreme
Court wrongly decided Allen.
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Lighlfoot"-a gerrymander that would have diluted minority voting strength in
Tuskegee, Alabama, by de-annexing virtually all black residents from the city-as
one sort of voting change they designed the preclearance requirement to foil.45
When Congress voted to extend the Voting Rights Act in 1970 and to expand
its coverage to include language minorities in 1975, Congress unhesitatingly
confirmed its intent to cover efforts to dilute minority voting strength.46 As the
Supreme Court asserted, "Had Congress disagreed with the interpretations of § 5
in Allen, it had ample opportunity to amend the statute."47

In short, both the

Supreme Court and Congress had created a blueprint for the Department's
implementation of the preclearance requirement.
V.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRECLEARANCE PROCESS

The effects ofAllen were profound. Mississippi had to submit the 1966 at-large
election statute for preclearance, and the Department of Justice refused to preclear
the change.4" Thirteen Mississippi counties nevertheless tried to switch to at-large
supervisor elections49 and another seventeen counties to at-large school board
elections, but the Department and, in some cases, the federal courts blocked all of

44. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
45. Id. at 341; H.R. REP. No. 439 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2439-40,
2500; see Lani Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-ReaganEra, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 393, 401 n.38 (1989); Pamela S. Karlan & Peyton McCrary, Without Fear and Without
Research: Abigail Thernstrom on the Voting Rights Act, 4 J.L. & POL., 751,755-57 (1988) (reviewing
THERNSTROM, supra note 13). In a simultaneous debate on another bill, Senator Robert F. Kennedy
of New York referred to the use of at-large elections as part of the effort of Southern white legislators
"to keep the Negro a political cripple indefinitely." 111 CONG. REC. 19329 (1965), quotedin ROBERT
G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS (1968).
46. See STEVEN F. LAWSON, IN PURSUIT OF POWER: SOUTHERN BLACKS AND ELECTORAL
PoLITIcs 130-151, 154-57, 227-29, 236-53 (1985).
47. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 533 (1973).
48. Mississippi chose to seek preclearance from the Attorney General rather than from a threejudge panel in the District of Columbia. See Letter from Jerris Leonard, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil
Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to A.F. Summer, Attorney Gen. State of Miss. (May 21, 1969)
(disallowing laws requiring appointment of county superintendents of education, new qualification
requirements for independent candidates, and optional use of at-large elections for county boards of
supervisors). Subsequently, the state adopted a revised version of the at-large provision for county
boards. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-5-15 (1972). When the Department discovered this change five years
later, it objected once again. Letter from Drew S.Days III, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to A.F. Summer, Attorney Gen., Miss. (July 8, 1977). See also LAWSON, supra
note 46, at 161-62 (discussing the evolution of voting rights enforcement); Frank R. Parker, County
Redistricting in Mississippi:Case Studies in Racial Gerrymandering,44 MISS. L.J. 391, 396 n.32
(1973) (detailing the Attorney General's enforcement efforts in Mississippi in the late 1960s and early
1970s).
49. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER 271 (1975)
[hereinafter THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT].
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these efforts." The task of winning constitutional challenges to the proposed
changes on a case-by-case basis would have been formidable.
The Department sees its role in preclearance reviews as a "surrogate" for the
District of Columbia trial courts." From the beginning, the Attorney General has
delegated responsibility for preclearance decisions to the Assistant Attorney
General ("AAG") who heads the Civil Rights Division. Administrative
reorganization in 1969 produced a separate section within the Civil Rights Division
that specializes in voting rights. The new Voting Rights Section then provided the
factual investigation for preclearance reviews and made detailed recommendations
to the AAG for Civil Rights.52 Prodded by liberal critics in Congress, the
Department developed detailed guidelines for enforcing Section 5 that the Supreme
Court subsequently endorsed. 3 Other Supreme Court decisions over the next
decade expanded the scope of Section 5 and strengthened the Department's
enforcement powers.54

The Supreme Court, however, has agreed to hear arguments and issue opinions
in only a few cases. As a result, the District of Columbia trial courts that hear
preclearance lawsuits have played a major role in shaping Section 5 case law. 5 The
Supreme Court often declined to hear oral argument and summarily affirmed the

trial court's decision. Although summary affirmances simply endorse the lower
court's decision and not necessarily its reasoning, they are binding precedent for the
lower courts and the Department of Justice until contradicted by a future Supreme
Court decision.56

50. Id at 271-72; Testimony of Frank R. Parker, Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), Exhibit 3, p. 149; see also WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT,
THE SHAMEFUL BLIGHT: THE SuRvIvAL OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING IN THE SOUTH

149-50

(1972) (declaring implementation in several Mississippi counties); Kathryn Healy Hester, Comment,
Mississippi and the Voting Rights Act: 1965-1982, 52 MISs. L.J., 803, 835 n.222 (1982) (listing all
the Department of Justice objections to the state of Mississippi from 1965 until 1982).
51. 28 C.F.R. § 51.52(a) (2004). The Department's original Section 5 guidelines set forth the
responsibility to act as a surrogate for the District of Columbia court. 28 C.F.R. § 51.19 (1972).
52. See LAWSON, supra note 46, at 162-63.
53. For procedures of the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, see 28
Fed. Reg. 18,186 (Sept. 10, 1971). The guidelines, which the Department has revised several times
over the years, are found at 28 C.F.R. § 51 (2004). Shortly after their adoption, the Supreme Court
found the regulations "wholly reasonable and consistent with the Act." Georgia v. United States, 411
U.S. 526, 541 (1973). For an analysis of the development of the procedures for enforcing Section 5,

see

HOWARD BALL ET AL., COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

1965

VOTING

RIGHTS ACT 64-73, 91-92 (1982), and LAWSON, supra note 46, at 162-78.
54. See Drew S. Days, I & Lani Guinier, Enforcement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, 167, 167-80 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984); John P. MacCoon, The
Enforcement of the PreclearanceRequirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 CATH.
U. L. REv. 107, 110-19 (1979).
55. MacCoon, supra note 54, at 120.
56. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-345 (1975) ("[L]ower courts are bound by
summary decisions by this Court 'until such time as the Court informs [them] that [they] are not."')
(alterations in original) (quoting Doe v. Hudgson, 478 F.2d 537,539 (1973)); see also Picou v. Gillum,
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VI. PURPOSE AND EFFECT IN BEER V. UNITED STATES

Section 5, like the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, contains both an
effect prong and a purpose prong.57 Initially, both the courts and the Department

viewed the effect standard of Section 5 as equivalent to that of a constitutional
challenge. 58 However, in a key 1976 decision, Beer v. United States,59 the Supreme
Court bifurcated the statutory and constitutional effect standards.

The Court

announced that in the Section 5 context, the Department should preclear a voting
change likely to produce a racially discriminatory effect prohibited by either the
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments unless the change would make matters worse

for minority voters than the existing plan, an effect the Court referred to as
"retrogression."60

Even so, the Beer Court recognized that the concept of "purpose" should have

the same definition under both Section 5 of the Act and the Constitution: "[A]n
ameliorative new legislative apportionment cannot violate § 5 unless the new
apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the
Constitution."61 As the Court explained a year earlier in City ofRichmond v. United

813 F.2d 1121, 1122 (11 th Cir. 1987) ("A summary affirmance by the Supreme Court has binding
precedential effect.") (citing Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344). On the other hand, the precedential value of a
summary affirmance has distinct limits. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 784 n.5 (1983)
("We have often recognized that the precedential effect of a summary affirmance extends no further
than 'the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions."') (quoting Mandel v.
Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977)); Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176 ("Because a summary affirmance is an
affirmance of the judgment only, the rationale of the affirmance may not be gleaned solely from the
opinion below... [but does] prevent lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise
issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions.").
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000) ("[T]hat such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice,
or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color .. ") (emphasis added). This Article uses the terms "purpose" and
"intent" and the terms "result" and "effect" interchangeably.
58. In Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 390 (1971), the Supreme Court observed that in
adopting Section 5, "Congress intended to adopt the concept of voting articulated in Reynolds v. Sims
...and protect Negroes against a dilution of their voting power." Id. (quoting Fairley v. Patterson, 393
U.S. 544, 588 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting)). In 1974, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia relied on the Fourteenth Amendment decision in White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755, 764-65 (1973), vacated, 422 U.S. 935 (1975), a Texas vote-dilution case, to assess
discriminatory effect and never reached the Section 5 purpose issue. Beer v. United States, 374 F.
Supp. 363, 387 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated, 425 U.S. 130, 143 (1976).

59. 425 U.S. at 130.
60. Id. at 141.
61. Id. at 141 (emphasis added). Commentators generally thought the reference in Beer to a
constitutional violation meant that courts and the Department of Justice should assess purpose in a
Section 5 context according to the same standard as in a constitutional challenge. See Mark A. Posner,
Post-1990Redistrictingsand the PreclearanceRequirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in

1990s, at 100 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998) ("Both the Attorney
General and the federal courts consistently have construed the Section 5 purpose test as being coextensive with the constitutional prohibition on enacting redistricting plans (or other voting practices
and procedures) that minimize minority electoral opportunity for a discriminatory reason."); see Steve
RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE
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States,62 a voting change adopted "for the purpose of discriminating against Negroes

on account of their race has no legitimacy at all under our Constitution or under the
statute. 63 The federal courts continued to apply a constitutional purpose test in
preclearance cases for the next quarter-century. 6
VII.

APPLYING THE RETROGRESSION STANDARD

A.

Registering and Casting the Ballot

The factual circumstances described in illustrative objection letters demonstrate
the sort of discriminatory practices Section 5 empowers the Department to confront.
When the Department interposes an objection, it sends the submitting jurisdiction
a letter explaining the objectionable change is not legally enforceable and
indicating the legal basis on which the Department made its decision. Although in
the early years these letters were often cryptic, they nevertheless provide the best

publicly available evidence of the Department's legal reasoning. During the 1970s,
the Department based most of its objections primarily on Section 5's effect prong.65

Bickerstaff, Reapportionmentby State Legislatures: A Guide for the 1980's, 34 Sw. L.J. 607, 669
(1980) ("The Beer Court dealt only with whether the reapportionment plan in question had the effect
of denying the right to vote on account of race. A state carries the additional burden of showing that
the plan does not have such a purpose."); James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race
Discrimination:Perspectiveson the Purposevs. Results Approachfrom the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA.
L. REv. 633, 685 (1983) ("Even without retrogression, a covered jurisdiction will violate section 5 if
an impermissible racial purpose is behind an electoral change.").
62. 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
63. Id. at 378 (1975).
64. See City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159, 168 (1982) (holding that even a nonretrogressive plan "would nevertheless be invalid if adopted for racially discriminatory purposes"); see
also City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 469, 471 n. 11, 472 (1987) (applying the
purpose test to conclude that refusing to annex a certain area after annexing others was a racially
motivated and discriminatory decision). Even Justices who opposed a strong Voting Rights Act seemed
to agree. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156,210 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("[I]t is clear that if the proposed changes would violate the Constitution, Congress could certainly
prohibit their implementation."); Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 516-17 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd
mem., 459 U.S. 1166 (1983) ("Simply demonstrating that a plan increases black voting strength does
not entitle the State to the declaratory relief it seeks; the State must also demonstrate the absence of a
discriminatory purpose."); Mississippi v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 569, 583 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd,
444 U.S. 1050 (1980) ("The prohibited 'purpose' of section 5 may be described as the sort of invidious
discriminatory purpose that would support a challenge to official action as an unconstitutional denial
of equal protection.").
65. Peyton McCrary et al. The End of PreclearanceAs We Knew It: How the Supreme Court
Transformed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 11 MICH. J. RACE &L. (forthcoming 2006) This study
examines all objection decisions between 1965 and 2004 (as conveyed to covered jurisdictions in 1,037
letters) and codes them as to the legal basis or bases for the objection (e.g., whether the change was
seen as having a retrogressive effect, a discriminatory purpose, or perhaps both). The need to apply a
consistent coding scheme for all letters necessitated treating all changes as retrogressive if they satisfied
the Beer standard, including those decided before Beer. Some changes were, of course, seen as
discriminatory in effect but not retrogressive.
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From its inception, the Voting Rights Act eliminated literacy tests for
registration and voting and required assistance at the polls for illiterate persons who
requested it.6 6 For that reason, the Department objected in 1969 to the repeal of a
Mississippi code provision that required assistance to illiterate voters.67 Ten years
later, Mississippi again sought to restrict assistance for illiterates by requiring the
assistant to be a registered voter, limiting the assistant to helping five voters, and
requiring the poll manager's presence during the assistance. 68 The Department
objected.69
Jurisdictions often sought to use all-white service clubs as polling places. In

1972, for example, a Louisiana parish proposed to use a Knights of Columbus Hall
to which "black citizens are not normally permitted access."7 Despite objection
letters from the Department of Justice, this practice did not die out. Two decades

later, a Georgia county sought to move a polling place from the county courthouse
(desegregated in 1968) to the American Legion Hall, despite the fact that "the
American Legion in Johnson County has a wide-spread reputation as an all-white
club with a history of refusing membership to black applicants.

'71

The Department

objected to the plan because "locating a polling place there [would have] the effect
of discouraging black voters from turning out to vote. "72
The Department found changes to polling places to make them less convenient

to minority voters to be retrogressive. New Orleans, for example, moved a polling
place in a ninety-two percent black precinct-without proper public notice and
without securing preclearance of the change-to an elementary school in a
noncontiguous precinct so that voters, "many of whom are elderly, would have to

66. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 70.
67. See Letter from Jerris Leonard, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to A.F. Summer, Attorney Gen., Miss. (May 26, 1969) (asserting that under state law
Mississippi had an obligation to "'provide to each illiterate voter who may request it such reasonable
assistance as may be necessary to permit such voter to cast his ballot in accordance with the voter's
own decision' (quoting United States v. Mississippi, 256 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Miss. 1966))); see also
O'Neal v. Simpson, 350 So. 2d 998, 1012 (Miss. 1977) (holding "[t]hat only blind, physically disabled
or illiterate voters may have a person accompany them into a voting booth for the purpose of assisting
a voter mark his ballot").
68. Letter from Drew S. Days III, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to A.F. Summer, Attorney Gen., Miss. (July 6, 1979).
69. Id. ("Under existing law.., illiterate voters could receive assistance from the person of their
choice, whether or not that person was a registered voter... , there was no limit on the number of
voters that one person could assist, and no other person was permitted or required to be present when
the assistance was given." (citing O'Neal, 350 So. 2d at 1012))
70. Letter from David L. Norman, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to George Buller, President, St. Landry Parish Police Jury (Dec. 6, 1972); see also Letter from
J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to George E.
Crawford, Court of Ordinary, Jones County, Ga. (Aug. 12, 1974) (objecting to use of a whites-only
Lions' Club as a polling place).
71. Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to Charlotte Beall, Probate Judge, Johnson County, Ga. (Oct. 28, 1992).
72. Id. at 2.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol57/iss4/7

12

McCrary: How the Voting Rights Act Works: Implementation of a Civil Rights
How THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT WORKS
2006]

cross an interstate highway approximately 170 feet wide to reach the new polling
place. '73 Further, no public transportation to the new polling place existed. 74 As

recently as 1995, a Georgia county tried to switch a polling place in an urban black
neighborhood with sidewalks, crosswalks, street lights, and a speed limit of 35
miles per hour to a location outside of the city limits on a blind curve on a highway
with a speed limit of 55 miles per hour in a predominantly white neighborhood.75
The Department saw that change as retrogressive.76

In 1991, the Lubbock County, Texas, Water Control and Improvement District
created polling places in the City of Lubbock convenient to white voters, but
required residents of two primarily minority precincts to travel to remote and
inaccessible rural communities to vote on election day.77 As the Department saw
it, "the now eliminated county courthouse voting site has been the most convenient
polling location for most minority voters." 78 In another county, the location of a
polling place for a particular precinct was "an issue that has divided the county
along racial lines for some years. ' 79 The first black person elected to the county
board in 1988 arranged to move the polling place to a community center located in
the predominantly black area of the precinct. 80 After his defeat by a white candidate
in a racially polarized election in 1992, the county moved the polling place one-totwo miles away to a volunteer fire department in a heavily white part of the
precinct.8'

73. Letter from Drew S. Days Ill, Assistant Attorney Gen,, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Ernest L. Salatich, Assistant City Attorney, New Orleans, Orleans Parish, La. (May 12,
1978). The Department also objected when a Mississippi county sought to establish a polling place at
the local Y.M.C.A., located in a white residential neighborhood "approximately five miles from the
predominantly black areas" in the precinct, and where "no public transportation to the polling place
existed." Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to John W. Prewitt, Attorney, Warren County Bd. of Supervisors (June 16, 1975).
74. Id. at 2.

75. Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to William E. Woodrum, County Attorney, Jenkins County, Ga. (Mar. 20, 1995). Because the
black community had no opportunity for input and the county provided no non-racial explanation for
the change, the Department saw this change as discriminatory in purpose as well as retrogressive. Id.
at 2-3.
76. Id. at 3.
77. See Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Don Graf, Esquire, McCleskey, Harniger, Brazil & Graf (Mar. 19, 1991).
78. Id. at 2.
79. Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to James P. Finstrom, District Attorney, Marion County, Tex. (Apr. 18, 1994).
80. Id. at 1.
81. Id. at 2. The Department viewed the county's claim that a concern for voter safety motivated
the move as pretextual because both races routinely used the community center for numerous nonvoting matters without evidence of safety problems. Id. at 2.
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B. At-Large Elections
Adopting at-large systems (multi-member districts) would necessarily be
retrogressive where voting patterns were racially polarized.8" In objecting to a
change to the at-large county commission elections in a Georgia county, the
Department pointed out African Americans were a majority of the registered voters
in one of the existing districts but a minority countywide.83 The Department added
that the dilutive effect of the at-large system was "magnified by the election of
commissioners from residency districts-essentially a [numbered] post
system"-and a majority vote requirement. 84
Changes from appointment to election caused objections where the jurisdiction
used at-large elections. For example, in 1967, the Department objected when the
county council of Sumter County, South Carolina, adopted at-large elections to

replace a system of gubernatorial appointment. 85 The Department saw the change
as discriminatory in effect; subsequently, a federal court saw the change as racially
discriminatory in purpose as well because the change took place when legislative
redistricting threatened to place the county in a black-majority senatorial district,
thus risking the appointment of council members responsive to black voters.8 6
In 1983, the Department objected to a similar change from appointment to atlarge election of the school board in a Georgia county on both purpose and
retrogression grounds.8" The legislative delegation pushed the change through

82. See Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITYVOTE DILUTION,
supra note 41, at 1, 4-5; McCrary, supra note 40 at 669-70; Peyton McCrary, Racially Polarized
Voting in the South: Quantitative Evidence from the Courtroom, 14 SOc. Sc. HIST. 507 (1990)
[hereinafter Racially Polarized Voting].
83. See Letter from David L. Norman, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to B. Rabun Faulk, Twiggs County Attorney, Jeffersonville, Ga. (Aug.7, 1972).
84. Id.at 2.
85. See Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to E.M. Dubose, County Adm'r, Sumter County, S.C. (Dec. 3, 1976).
86. County Council of Sumter County v. United States, 596 F. Supp. 35, 36 (D.D.C. 1984). For
a discussion of this objection and the evidence regarding the change from appointive to elective
councils developed in subsequent litigation, see Vernon Burton et al., South Carolina, in QUIET
REVOLUTION, supranote 2, at 208-09. In a similar instance, the Georgia legislature enacted a change
from appointment by the local grand jury to at-large elections for the school board in Harris County,
Georgia. The Department saw the change as discriminatory in effect because under the appointive
system, two of the board's members were black, and Harris County's election history made it likely that
at-large elections would dilute black voting strength. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant
Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Ken Askew, County Attorney, Harris
County, Ga. (Aug. 18, 1975).
87. Letter from Win. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to George M. Stembridge, Jr., Attorney for Baldwin County Bd. of Educ. (Sept. 19, 1983).
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"even though members of the minority community and the members of the board
88
of education sitting at that time strongly opposed the adoption of such a system.
Multi-member districts were still a part of state legislative redistrictings in the
1980s and were the subject of frequent objections. North Carolina adopted a
constitutional amendment in 1968 that prohibited the splitting of any county in
drawing legislative districts but did not submit it for preclearance until 1981. The
Department objected to the constitutional provision as retrogressive on the grounds
that its practical effect was to require the use of multi-member districts and thus,
because of the state's pattern of racially polarized voting, to increase the likelihood
of diluting minority voting strength.89 North Carolina also used multi-member
districts for both its senate and house, and the Department found both of these plans
retrogressive as well.9°
C. Enhancing Devices
Even when voting patterns are racially polarized, a cohesive minority group can
use single-shot voting in a simple at-large system to elect one representative if

voters are filling several offices.91 There are several methods that can make singleshot voting impossible: 1) requiring all voters to vote for the full-slate, in other
words "to vote for as many candidates as there are positions available;" 2) requiring

each candidate to qualify for a separate place or post; 3) requiring candidates to
reside in a particular geographic district; or 4) requiring the council members to
serve staggered terms of office. 92

88. Id. at 2 ("Public opposition was based on the concern that the changes would likely reduce
the minority representation which had been accomplished as a result of a special effort to assure
minority representation on the then appointed board of education.").
89. Letter from Win. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Alex K. Brock, Executive Sec'y-Dir., N.C. State Bd. of Elections (Nov. 30, 1981).
90. See Letter from Win. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Alex K. Brock, Executive Sec'y-Dir. N.C. State Bd. of Elections (Jan. 20, 1982)
(finding North Carolina's house reapportionment plans retrogressive); Letter from Win. Bradford
Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Alex K. Brock,
Executive Sec'y-Dir., N.C. State Bd. of Elections (Dec. 7, 1981) (objecting to state senate's
redistricting plans as retrogressive). On April 19, 1982, the Department once again objected to both
plans, but on the basis of the demographic configuration of districts rather than to the use of at-large
elections. Letter from Win. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Jerris Leonard, Esquire, Jerris Leonard & Assoc., P.C. (Apr. 19, 1982). Revised state
senate and house plans were eventually precleared, but private plaintiffs ultimately launched a
successful challenge on the grounds that the use of multi-member districts diluted African American
voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Act. See Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345
(E.D.N.C. 1984), affd sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
91. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 49, at 207.
92. Id. at 207-08; see also Katharine I. Butler, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to
Election Structures:Dilution and the Value of the Right to Vote, 42 LA. L. REv. 851, 863-67 (1982)

(examining the impact election structure has on black candidates). For another pioneering study, see
Roy E. YOUNG, THE PLACE SYSTEM IN TEXAS ELECTIONS (1965).
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As the Department explained in objecting to such devices in Lancaster County,
South Carolina, minority voters have the potential to elect a candidate of their
choice through "the selective use of single-shot voting."93 However, this potential

is thwarted "if an otherwise at-large election to fill multiple identical offices is
transformed into a number of separate election contests through the imposition of
numbered and residency post requirements and the staggering of terms of office."94

A Georgia municipality, Jonesboro, in Clayton County, added numbered place and
majority vote requirements shortly after voters elected the first black person to the
council under the old plurality vote rule.

Despite his incumbency, the black

councilman lost when he ran for reelection under the new system, and the
Department subsequently objected to Jonesboro's municipal election laws.95

Reidsville, North Carolina, adopted staggered terms for its city council
members, reducing the number of open seats from five to either two or three. In its
objection letter, the Department expressed concern "in the fact that all three of the
black persons who were elected successively to the council over the last eleven

years initially obtained incumbency by placing fifth, a position that would not have
resulted in their election under the proposed change." 96 The Department also

objected to the use of staggered terms for a South Carolina city council.97 Under
the proposed system, "only the candidates who place[d] first or second [would] be
elected," but the record showed that "the one black candidate who ha[d] been

93. See Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Treva Ashworth, Assistant Attorney Gen., S.C. (Oct. 1, 1974) (objecting to the numbered
post requirement, residency districts, staggered terms, and the majority vote requirement for the county
council).
94. Id. at 2.
95. Letter from David L. Norman, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Lee Hutcheson, Esquire, Hutcheson, Kilpatrick, Watson, Crumbley & Brown (Feb. 4, 1972).
In objecting to a numbered place requirement for the city of Lakeland, in Lanier County, Georgia, on
Oct. 17, 1978, the Department quoted Dunston v. Scott:
"It is clear that the numbered seat law may have the effect of curtailing minority
voting power. In a true at large election, if the majority spreads its vote around
and the minority single shot votes, the minority strength is concentrated, thus
increasing their [sic] chance of electing. However, if the minority candidate is
forced to run against a specific candidate or candidates for a specific seat, the
majority can readily identify for whom they must vote in order to defeat the
minority candidate."
Letter from Drew S. Days, II, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice to
George Wynn, Attorney, Lakeland, Ga. (Oct. 17, 1978) (quoting Dunston v. Scott, 336 F. Supp. 206,
213 n.9 (E.D.N.C. 1972)).
96. Letter from John Z. Muerta, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice to Albert J. Post, City Attorney, Reidsville, N.C. (Aug. 3, 1979).
97. Letter from Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to R.
Powell Black, Town Advisor, Jefferson, S.C. (Mar. 26, 1984).
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successful in city council elections [came] in third out of eleven candidates in 1976,
fourth out of seven in 1980, and third out of eight in 1982."98
Requiring runoff elections when no candidate receives a majority of the votes
can also have a discriminatory effect. Where a plurality rule applies, one minority
candidate can defeat several white candidates if white voters sufficiently split their
ballots. Requiring a runoff eliminates that possibility by setting up a head-to-head
contest between the top two choices so that white voters can rally as a bloc behind
the white candidate. 99

In Augusta, Georgia, the city council had sixteen members, and voters from the
entire city elected two persons from each of eight residency districts to three-year
staggered terms under a plurality rule.' ° African American candidates typically
won only two of eight contests in any election, and thus held only four seats
(twenty-five percent of the council), although they were forty to forty-five percent
of the city's registered voters.l"' The Department objected to the proposed majority
vote requirement as retrogressive, observing the substantial under-representation of
African Americans, and that black council members managed to get elected in the
past only because of the plurality rule."0 2

As more and more jurisdictions changed from at-large to district elections in the
1980s, usually in response to lawsuits or the threat of litigation, the number of
objections to the adoption of numbered posts, staggered terms, and runoff
requirements declined. Even in the 1990s, however, these enhancing devices still
sometimes surfaced as problems. When faced with a Section 2 lawsuit from
98. Id. at 1. The Department also objected to staggered terms for the city council in Barnwell,
South Carolina, and for the school board in Lancaster County, South Carolina. See Letter from Win.
Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to C. Havird
Jones, Assistant Attorney Gen., S.C. (Apr. 27, 1984) (indicating "the use of staggered terms in
Lancaster County school board elections, where the at-large system is used and racial bloc voting seems
to exist, limits the potential for black voters to participate effectively in the electoral process"); Letter
from Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Thomas M. Boulware, Esq., Brown, Jeffries & Boulware (Mar. 26, 1984) (determining that the city's
plan to reduce the number of council positions available in Barnwell by staggering terms "has the effect
of limiting the potential of minority voters to elect the candidate of their choice and, thus, constitutes
a retrogression").
99. See CHANDLER DAVIDSON, BIRACIAL POLITICS: CONFLICT AND COALITION IN THE
METROPOLITAN SouTH 63-67 (1972); Butler, supra note 92, at 865-67.
100. Peyton McCrary, The Dynamics of Minority Vote Dilution: The Case ofAugusta, Georgia,

1945-1986,25 J. OFURB. HIST. 199, 212 (1999); see also id. at 224 n.75 ("With elections held virtually
every year and sixteen council members, a runoff system would have increased the cost of administering
elections substantially.").
101. Id. at 212-13.
102. Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Samuel F. Maguire, City Attorney, Augusta, Georgia (Mar. 2, 1981). The Department
also objected to the adoption of a majority vote requirement in Greenville, North Carolina, noting that
"since 1965 only one black candidate has achieved election, and then only by placing sixth when he
was first elected with a plurality of the vote." Letter from John E. Muerta, Acting Assistant Attorney
Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to A. Louis Singleton, Esq., Gaylord, Singleton &
McNally (Apr. 7, 1980).
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minority plaintiffs, Galveston, Texas, agreed to go to a system with six singlemember districts and no at-large seats, which the Department precleared.'03 In
1998, however, Galveston sought to return to a mixed plan. Now that the
benchmark was a district election system, the addition of at-large seats, a majority
vote rule, and a numbered place requirement was retrogressive in light of the city's
continued polarized voting.'4
D. Redistricting Plans

Assessing the racial effects of a redistricting plan presents two distinct
quantitative issues. First, do the districts identified by the submitting authority as
minority opportunity districts-usually majority-minority districts-actually afford
minority voters a reasonable or fair opportunity to elect candidates of their choice?
In other words, are they electorally viable? Second, does the plan minimize the
number of effective minority opportunity districts? A redistricting plan can
minimize the number of minority opportunity districts either by "packing" an
unnecessarily high percentage of minority citizens (for example eighty or ninety
percent) into a single district, or by fragmenting minority population concentrations
so the group's members are dispersed among several white-majority districts.'l 5
Because African American and Hispanic populations typically contain a higher
percentage of persons under the age of eighteen than white or Anglo populations,
the proportion of a district's voting-age population belonging to that group is
usually lower than its percentage of the total population. And because minority
citizens typically register to vote at a lower rate than the majority community, the
minority group normally forms a smaller proportion of the registered voters than of
the voting-age population. Because minority voters, who are often significantly
lower in socio-economic status and educational background, frequently turn out at
a lower rate than in the majority community, they often make up a smaller
percentage of the turnout than of the registered voters.° 6

103. The Department had objected to an initial settlement proposal because the city ignored the
plaintiffs' stated preferences for a single-member district plan with no at-large council seats, and its
own charter review committee's finding that the at-large seats and numbered places would have a
discriminatory effect. Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Gary W. Smith, City Attorney, Galveston, Tex. (Dec. 14, 1992).
104. Letter from Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Barbara E. Roberts, City Attorney, Galveston, Tex. (Dec. 14, 1998).
105. Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymanderingand Legislative Reapportionment,in MINORITY
VOTE DILUTION, supranote 54, at 89-92,96-99; Hiroshi Motomura, PreclearanceUnderSection Five
of the Voting Rights Act, 61 N.C. L. REv. 189, 233-36 (1983).
106. See BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING
EQUALITY, 118-22 (1992).
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Recognizing those facts, in the 1970s, the federal courts came up with a rule of
thumb often dubbed "the 65 percent rule."' 7 As minority registration and turnout
rates increased-by the 1990s to a point approaching parity with whites---courts
began to approve districts that contained a smaller percentages of minorities.
Where a substantial minority of white voters have demonstrated a tendency to
support minority candidates, the minority threshold can be lowered accordingly.' 08
For these reasons, the Department of Justice and the courts assess district

composition on a case-by-case basis.' 09
The Department routinely encountered redistricting plans that fragmented
minority voting strength. Grenada County, Mississippi, for example, twice adopted
objectionable plans the Department viewed as unnecessarily fragmenting black
population concentrations and minimizing black voting strength in the city of
Grenada."O Attala County, Mississippi, redrew boundaries to convert a sixty-four

percent black district to one with a black population of only fifty-two percent, and
107. Id. at 120; see Kirksey v. Bd. of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 160 n.2 (5th Cir. 1977) (en
banc); Mississippi v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 569,575 (D.D.C. 1979), aft'd,444 U.S. 1050 (1980).
108. See Allan J. Lichtman & J. Gerald Hebert, A General Theory of Vote Dilution, 6 LA RAZA
L.J. 1, 10-19 (1993); J. Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influence Districts and the Pragmatic
Tradition in Voting Rights Law, 27 U.S.F. L. REv. 551, 563-67 (1993).
109. See GROFMAN, supra note 106, at 120.
110. See Letter form J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Attorney for Bd. Of Supervisors, Grenada County, Miss. (Mar. 30, 1976); Letter from J.
Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Attorney for Bd.
of Supervisors, Grenada County, Miss. (Aug. 9, 1973); see also Letter from Wm.Bradford Reynolds,
Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Paul Lyle, Esq., Day, Owen, Lyle,
Voss & Owen (Apr. 10, 1986) (objecting to Plainview Independent School District's electing
procedures, as they "needlessly fragment[ed] the concentrated minority population among four of the
five districts"); Letter from Win. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to James W. Burgoon, Jr., Esq., Fraiser, Burgoon and Abraham, Leflore County, Miss.
(Sept. 6, 1983) (objecting to a Leflore County, Mississippi, plan because its fragmentation of the black
community was not only "unnecessary, but it place[d] black voters into districts which lack[ed] a
commonality of interest"); Letter from Wm.Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights
Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Luciene C. Gwin, Jr., Esq., Handy, Fitzpatrick, Gwin & Lewis (July 11,
1983) (objecting to the redistricting plan of Adams County, Mississippi, on the grounds that "[i]t
was
...drawn without affording representatives of the black community any opportunity to participate in
the redistricting process"); Letter from Wm.Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Civil Rights Divi., to Benjamin E. Griffith, Esq., Jacobs, Griffith, Eddins & Povall (June 13,
1983) (objecting to the redistricting plan of Bolivar County, Mississippi, as "the new plan heighten[ed]
the fragmentation of the large black population concentration in the City of Cleveland"); Letter from
Win. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to John K.
Keys, Esq. (May 23, 1983) (objecting to the reapportionment plan of districts in Covington County,
Mississippi, where the "plan fragment[ed] the large black population concentration in the City of
Collins, and ... minimize[d] its voting strength by preventing black citizens there from electing
candidates of their choice"); Letter from Wm.Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights
Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Henry L. Crisp, Esquire, Crisp, Oxford & Gatewood (Dec. 17, 1982)
(objecting to the redistricting plan for the School District of Sumter County, Georgia, where "[t]he
division of the black community by the configuration of the proposed Districts 2 and 4 fragment[ed]
the black voting strength for apparently no compelling governmental reason and such fragmentation
need not exist in a fairly drawn plan").
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thus, a white voting-age majority."' The plan also divided the predominantly black

neighborhoods of the county seat among three districts.
therefore, objected as "several factors of the ...

12

The Department,

plan would have the effect of

unnecessarily diluting the voting strength of the black community.""' 3 One
Louisiana city engaged in both common gerrymandering tactics, concentrating as
many African Americans as possible into one entirely black district ("packing") and
fragmenting ("cracking") the rest of the city's black population so that none of the
other districts contained more than a fourty-two percent black population." 4
E. Annexations, De-annexations,and Consolidations

Annexations that decrease the percentage of a city's likely voters who belong
to a racial minority group necessarily dilute the group's voting strength and thus
have the potential for retrogression. Rather than freeze the boundaries of cities that
have a legitimate need to expand in order to capture suburban citizens who have
higher incomes or other sources of tax revenue, the Department and the federal
courts preclear dilutive annexations where the city uses, or agrees to adopt,
a system
115
of elections that fairly reflects minority voting strength in the new city.
In 1971, the Department objected to an annexation by Richmond, Virginia, that
increased the city's population by approximately 43,000 people, most of whom
were white, thus reducing the black population from a fifty-two percent majority to
a forty-two percent minority.11 6 The Department objected because in "Richmond,
where representatives are elected at-large, substantially increasing the number of
eligible white voters inevitably tends to dilute the voting strength of black
voters."''. The Department would preclear the annexation, however, if the city were

to switch from at-large elections to a fair election plan, such as single-member
districts." 8

111. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to John C. Love, Sr., Attorney for Bd. of Supervisors, Attala County, Miss. (Sept. 3, 1974).
112. Id. at 2.
113. Id.
114. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Virginia C. Godfrey, Mayor, Many, La. (Apr. 13, 1976).
115. See City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 371 (1975); City of Petersburg v.
United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1024, 1031 (D.D.C. 1972), affd mem., 410 U.S. 962 (1973).
116. Letter from David L. Norman, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to C.B. Mattoz, Jr., City Attorney, Richmond, Va. (May 7, 1971).
117. Id. at 1.
118. Id. at 2. When city officials met with Attorney General John Mitchell to request a
withdrawal of the objection, they enlisted the participation of one of Richmond's leading citizens,
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who soon joined the Supreme Court. Letter from Lewis F. Powell. Jr. to John N.
Mitchell (Aug. 9, 1971) (public document, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of
Justice). The Attorney General did not withdraw the objection and the city subsequently filed a Section
5 declaratory judgment action, seeking judicial preclearance of its annexation. Powell was an Associate
Justice by the time the case made its way to the Supreme Court, and as a matter of course, recused
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In 1972, the Department objected to another annexation on the same principle
as in Richmond, this time by the neighboring city of Petersburg, Virginia. The
annexation decreased the city's population from fifty-six to forty-seven percent
black, but black leaders generally supported the move in order to increase
Petersburg's tax revenue base." 9 Recognizing that the effect of the annexation
would be to decrease the chances of electing African Americans to the city council,
a black council member proposed a change from the existing at-large system to
elections from single-member districts, which his colleagues on the council
rejected.12 0 The Department refused to preclear the annexation despite its
recognition that the city had legitimate economic reasons to justify expanding its
boundaries, but agreed to reconsider the objection if Petersburg "were to adopt a
fairly drawn system of single member wards."'' Petersburg then filed a Section 5
declaratory judgment action, but the three-judge panel adopted the Department's
approach.' Thereafter, the Richmond-Petersburg models shaped the Department's
approach to evaluating annexations.'
VI1. THE SECTION 2 RESULTS TEST

During the 1970s, plaintiffs in Fourteenth Amendment dilution cases often won
by documenting a history of racial segregation and discrimination in the
jurisdiction, and by showing, due to racially polarized voting, the election system
operated in such a way that minority voters did not have a reasonable opportunity

himself.
119. Letter from David L. Norman, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to John S. Davenport, III,
Attorney, Mays, Valentine, Davenport & Moore (Feb. 22, 1972).
120. Id. at 2.; see also City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1024, 1027
(D.D.C. 1972) (discussing the reasons and effects for the annexation, as well as the rejection of singlemember districts), aff'd, 410 U.S. 962 (1973) and 412 U.S. 901 (1973).
121. Objection Letter from Norman to Davenport, supra note 119, at 3.
122. 354 F. Supp. at 1031.
123. See, e.g., Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to John S. Davenport, I, Attorney, Mays, Valentine, Darenport & Moore (July 14,
1975) (objecting to the annexation plans submitted by the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, as
"commensurate with [City of Richmond and City of Petersburg] . .. the annexation submitted for
review will . . .have a racially dilutive effect on voting in Lynchburg"); Letter from J. Stanley
Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Harold L. Davenport,
Mayor, City of Alabaster, Alabama (July 7, 1975) (asserting that "commensurate with the [court]
decisions cited above [the Department] cannot conclude that the major annexations taken together will
not have a dilutive effect on voting in Alabaster"); U.S. Dep't of Justice, to J. Howard McEniry, Jr.,
City Attorney, Bessemer, Ala. (Sept. 20, 1974) ("giv[ing] careful consideration to recent federal court
decisions," the Department objected to the city of Bessemer's annexation plans); Letter from J. Stanley
Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Morris D. Mosen, Corp.
Counsel, Charleston, S.C. (Sept. 20, 1974) (objecting to annexations by the City of Charleston, South
Carolina, and relying on City of Richmond and City of Petersburg).
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to elect representatives of their choice. 124 In 1980, however, the Supreme Court
ruled in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 125 a challenge to Mobile's use of at-large
elections, that under the Fourteenth Amendment plaintiffs must prove that the city
adopted or maintained an election method for the purpose of diluting minority
voting strength. 26 Presented with a Supreme Court decision that appeared to
contradict congressional intent, a substantial majority in Congress voted to revise
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to create a statutory means of accomplishing
what could no longer be won under the Fourteenth Amendment. Amended Section
2 outlawed election methods that resulted in diluting minority voting strength,
127
without requiring proof of discriminatory intent.
Even so, in a few complex Section 2 lawsuits in the 1980s, evidence of
discriminatory intent proved critical to the court's decision, most dramatically in
one consolidated Alabama case, Dillard v. Crenshaw County.'28 This complex
litigation ultimately led to the elimination of at-large elections in more than 180
counties, municipalities, and school boards throughout Alabama. 129 The plaintiffs
presented historical evidence that showed whenever black voting strength was
substantial, state and local officials had a policy of using at-large rather than district
elections. 30 The evidence also showed the state, motivated explicitly by the goal of
preventing the election of blacks to office, adopted laws in the 1950s and 1960s that

124. The Supreme Court initially set forth the legal standard in vote-dilution lawsuits in White
v. Regester,412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973), vacated,422 U.S. 935 (1975) and spelled it out in greater
detail in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), affd sub nom. E.
CarrollParishSchool Board.v. Marshall,424 U.S. 636 (1976). See generally James U. Blacksher
& Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs
Commandeeredthe Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1982) (discussing the history of

minority vote dilution and the Supreme Court's attempt to regulate it by implementing standards for
lower courts); Timothy G. O'Rourke, Constitutionaland Statutory Challenges to Local At-Large

Elections, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 39 (1982) (reviewing the evolution of constitutional challenges to atlarge systems and discussing the standards against which these systems are evaluated).
125. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
126. Id. at 66. When the case went to trial a second time under the new intent standard, the trial
judge relied on expert testimony by historians in ruling that racial discrimination was clearly a
motivating factor in the adoption of the city's at-large system. Bolden v.City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp.
1050 (S.D. Ala. 1982); see also Peyton McCrary, History in the Courts: The Significance of City of
Mobile v. Bolden, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 54, at 47-63 (summarizing the historical
evidence in this and a companion case, Brown v. Board of School Commissioners, 542 F. Supp. 1078

(S.D. Ala. 1982), afftd, 706 F.2d 1103 (11 th Cir. 1983), affd 464 U.S. 1005 (1983)).
127. Frank R. Parker, The "Results'"Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the
Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715, 716-17 (1983); see Armand Derfner, Vote Dilution and the
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 54, 145-63;Thomas
M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative
History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (1983).

128. 640 F. Supp. 1347 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (granting a preliminary injunction against further use
of at-large elections for electing county commissioners in nine defendant jurisdictions).
129. Peyton McCrary et al., Alabama, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 53-54, 61-65.
130. Peyton McCrary & J. Gerald Hebert, Keeping the Courts Honest: The Role of Historians
as Expert Witnesses in Southern Voting Rights Cases, 16 S.U. L. REV. 101, 118-19 (1989).
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required the use of anti-single shot31devices in all jurisdictions to enhance the
dilutive power of at-large elections.'
Over the next quarter-century, voting rights lawyers successfully brought
numerous lawsuits under the new results standard. The Supreme Court made clear
in Thornburg v. Gingles'32 that minority plaintiffs could win by showing voting
patterns in the community resulted in racial polarization to the degree that minority
candidates usually lost and by showing that it would be possible to draw a
districting plan providing at least one majority-minority district.'33 Thus, after
Thornburg, many defendants settled before trial and went to single-member
districts. 134A recent study indicated that "of the 209 [Section 2] lawsuits that ended

with a determination of liability, 98 (46.9 percent) originated in jurisdictions
covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act."1 35 Of the 209 liability decisions36
examined, courts found a Section 2 violation in eighty-eight (42 percent) of them.
In another twenty-nine cases, minority plaintiffs won a preliminary injunction,
negotiated a favorable settlement plan, or otherwise achieved a successful
outcome. 137
IX.

THE "CLEAR VIOLATION OF SECTION 2" RULE

When Congress created a new statutory means of attacking minority vote
dilution, it did not simultaneously revise the language of Section 5.I38 The
legislative history provides evidence that Congress believed the Department should
object where the voting change would violate the new Section 2 results standard.
According to the 1982 Senate report, "In light of the amendment to section 2, it is
intended that a section 5 objection also follow if a new voting procedure itself so

131. Id. at 119-21. For other cases where intent evidence was important during the 1980s, see
Peyton McCrary, DiscriminatoryIntent: The ContinuingRelevance of "Purpose"Evidence in VoteDilution Lawsuits, 28 HOw. L.J. 463 (1985).
132. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
133. Id. at 80.
134. See Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Laws Affecting Racial and
Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 35.
135. ELLENKATZ ET AL., DOCUMENTINGDISCRIMINATION IN VOTING: JUDICIALFNDINGS UNDER

SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT SINCE 1982 8 (2005), availableat http://sitemaker.umich.edy/
votingrights/files/finalreport/pdf.
136. Id. In ninety-one lawsuits, forty-four of them in jurisdictions covered by Section 5, courts
made a judicial finding of racially polarized voting. Id. at 16.
137. Id.
138. In Reno v. BossierParishSchool Board (BossierParish1), 520 U.S. 471 (1997), aff'd, 528
U.S. 320 (2000), Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, treated the fact that Congress did not
revise Section 5 as dispositive evidence that Congress did not intend preclearance to be denied when
a voting change would violate Section 2: "Congress, among other things, renewed § 5 but did so
without changing its applicable standard." Id. at 484.
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discriminates as to violate section 2."'"9 Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy and
Republican Representative James Sensenbrenner, two key sponsors of the revised
statute, each pointed to this language in the Senate report during floor debates,
interpreting it to mean that changes that violated Section 2 would now be
objectionable under Section 5 as well.14 Democratic Representative Don Edwards,
who chaired the subcommittee charged with drafting the House bill and sponsored
the final version of the revised Act, concurred in this view.'424 1 Congressional

opponents of the 1982 amendments did not dispute this view. 1
In 1985, the Department of Justice proposed the first revision of its Section 5
guidelines following the 1982 amendments.' 4 3 As finally adopted, a new provision
required a denial of preclearance where "a bar to implementation of the change is
necessary to prevent a clear violation of amended Section 2."'" This new test was

139. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 12 n.31 (1982) as reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N 177, 189. But see
Bossier Parish1, 520 U.S. at 484 (dismissing the significance of this expression of intent from the
Senate Report: "We doubt that Congress would depart from the settled interpretation of § 5 and impose
a demonstrably greater burden on the jurisdictions covered by § 5 ...by dropping a footnote in a
Senate Report instead of amending the statute itself.").
140. 128 CONG. REc. 14,292 (1982) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 128 CONG. REc. 12,934-35
(1982) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). The majority in BossierParishIignored all evidence on
this issue in the CongressionalRecord. See 520 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1997).
141. 128 CONG. REc. 14,934 (1982) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
142. Mark E. Haddad, Note, Getting Results UnderSection 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE

L.J. 139, 150-51 (1984). However, two Georgia congressmen from metropolitan Atlanta, Wyche
Fowler and Elliott Levitas, asked Chairman Edwards during floor debate-without referring in any way
to the revised Section 2-whether Section 5 had been revised in any way in the new bill, and he replied
that it had not. Id. (citing 128 Cong. Rec. 14,938 (1982) (statement of Rep. Edwards)). The most
plausible reading of this colloquy is that Representative Edwards believed he was responding to a
question about the language of Section 5 itself, which had not changed, rather than to the standard for
implementing Section 5 under the revised Act. As Laughlin McDonald observed, "to the extent that
there is a conflict between the Senate Report and the statements of key sponsors of the bill (Senator
Kennedy and Representative Sensenbrenner) on the one hand, and the colloquies by Representatives
Fowler and Levitas on the other, the former clearly take precedence over the latter." Laughlin
McDonlad, Racial Fairness-Why Shouldn't It Apply to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act?, 21
STETSON L. REV. 847, 863 (1992).

143. The Department published the proposed revision for comments on May 6, 1985. See
Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 50 Fed. Reg. 19,122
(May 6, 1985). Oversight hearings were then held on the proposed guidelines. Proposed Changes to
Regulations Governing Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Civil and
ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong., (1985) [hereinafter Oversight

Hearings]. The Subcommittee received comments from 120 persons or organizations, and published
the final version at Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
as Amended, 52 Fed. Reg. 490 (Jan. 6, 1987) (codified at 28 C.F.R § 51).
144. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 Fed.
Reg. at 498. (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 51.55(b)). Criticism in the oversight hearings focused on the
Department's policy that, in applying the new basis for objecting to voting changes, the burden of proof
for determining whether the new voting procedure would clearly violate Section 2 lay with the
Department, not the submitting jurisdiction. Oversight Hearings, supra note 143, at 49, 149-53,
167-71. On the other hand, two academic critics, Professors Timothy G. O'Rourke and Katharine I.
Butler, contended that the legislative history of the 1982 Act provides an insufficient basis for
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relatively short-lived, as only a decade later the Supreme Court determined in
Bossier ParishI that a denial of preclearance was not appropriate simply on the
grounds that the proposed change would clearly violate Section 2.145 Regardless, the
new Section 2 test was rarely the sole basis of an objection. The two principal
reasons for objecting to voting
changes continued to be retrogressive effect and
46
unconstitutional purpose. 1
X. APPLYING THE PURPOSE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 5

A.

At-Large Elections

In the 1980s, the Department based a growing number of objections on the
purpose requirement of Section 5. Few covered jurisdictions chose to adopt at-large
elections. The most common objections to at-large elections or multi-member
districts arose from their use in mixed plans at the local level. The plans were

typically not retrogressive but often had a discriminatory purpose. For example,
West Baton Rouge Parish used a multi-member district for the city of Port Allen in
a mixed plan for its school board in 1982, rejecting nine alternative single-member
district plans because each "contained at least one district in the Port Allen area
from which blacks would have had a realistic opportunity to elect a representative
'
of their choice."147
The county commission in Bladen County, North Carolina,
rejected a compromise plan that would have provided African American voters a
fair opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. A districting study committee,
which the county commission itself had appointed, proposed the compromise, but
county officials opted for a plan that "would maintain white political control to the
maximum extent possible and thereby minimize the opportunity for effective
political participation by black citizens." '48
Following a vote-dilution lawsuit in which the courts found the city's at-large

incorporating Section 2 in a Section 5 analysis at all, even with the Department bearing the burden of
proof. Id. at 35-38, 63, 69-75.
145. Bossier Parish1, 520 U.S. 471,474, 485 (1997), aff'd, 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
146. McCrary et al., End of Preclearance,supra note 65, app. tbls.2 & 3; see also Posner, supra
note 61, at 84 (asserting that in the 1990s, "only one redistricting objection relied exclusively on
Section 2").
147. Letter from Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to L.C. Lutz, West Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd. (Nov. 8, 1982). A second letter declined
to withdraw the objection. Letter from Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights
Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to L.C. Lutz, W. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd. (Mar. 14, 1983) (relying for
its legal authority on the view of the purpose prong expressed in City of Richmond v. United States, 422
U.S. 358, 378-79 (1975); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976); City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156, 172 (1980); and the trial court decision in Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 516
(D.D.C. 1982), affd, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983)).
148. Letter from Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to W. Leslie Johnson, Jr., Esq., Johnson & Johnson (Nov. 2, 1987).
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system violative of Section 2,"' the City of Baytown, Texas, adopted a remedial
plan with five single-member districts and four council members elected at-large
from numbered posts. 5 ° The Department objected that, while the plan was not
retrogressive, the city acted with a discriminatory purpose in rejecting alternatives
proposed by African American and Hispanic spokespersons and, by including atlarge seats, "chose the election plan that offers minority voters the least opportunity
to ...elect candidates of their choice."15'
B. Redistricting

The growing importance of the purpose prong, which often served as the basis
for objections in the area of redistricting, appears to reflect the views of Assistant
Attorney General W. Bradford Reynolds, the conservative Republican head of the
Civil Rights Division during much of the decade. In objecting to a 1985
redistricting plan in Sunflower County, Mississippi, for example, Reynolds drew on
his personal observations of the county seat, Indianola, when traveling through the
Mississippi Delta in 1983 with Jesse Jackson. 5 Reynolds believed the district lines
unnecessarily divided cohesive black neighborhoods and ignored obvious physical
boundaries. The objection letter sent to Sunflower County reflected this view: "The
railroad tracks form a natural boundary within Indianola and it is well recognized
that this boundary divides neighborhoods as well as communities of interest. Yet
in devising the submitted plan, the railroad tracks apparently were ignored as a
potential district boundary line."' 53 Nor had the county provided any "nonracial
explanation ...as to why the district boundaries of the submitted plan continue[d]
to meander through the streets of the black community in so divisive a manner,
particularly in light of the strong opposition of the black community.' 15 4 Applying
the Section 5 purpose standard, Reynolds concluded that the redistricting plan "was
devised consciously to assure that the black population percentage of any district
would not increase appreciably."' 55 Purpose continued to be a critical issue in

149. Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1250 (5th Cir. 1988).
150. Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Randall Strong, City Attorney, Baytown, Tex. (Mar. 20, 1989).
151. Id. at2.
152.

RAYMOND WOLTERS, RIGHT TURN: WILLIAM BRADFORD REYNOLDS, THE REAGAN

ADMINISTRATION, AND BLACK CIvIL RIGHTS 71-73 (1996).
153. Letter from Wm.Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Atty. Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Tommy McWilliams, Esq., Townsend, McWilliams, & Holladay (June 7, 1985).
154. Id. at 2.
155. Id. Though many praised Reynolds for his work, some critics "disparaged him as a
headstrong ideologue." WOLTERS, supra note 152, at 9. One critic, Abigail Thernstrom, criticized
Reynolds for enforcing Section 5 so as to maximize minority voting strength, contrary to the
requirements of federal law. THERNSTROM, supra note 13, at 170-72. Thernstrom particularly
emphasized redistricting objections in Barbour County, Alabama, which she thought were unwarranted.
Id. at 172-79. Yet, like the Sunflower County example cited above, both Barbour County plans
involved oddly-shaped districts that fragmented black voting strength. The plans were drawn without
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Section 5 redistricting decisions in the 1990S.116 A redistricting plan for Lauderdale
County, Mississippi, "unnecessarily... fragment[ed] the concentration of the black
community within the City of Meridian into three separate districts," where only
one would have a black majority despite strong opposition from black leaders who
presented alternative plans that would divide the county into four districts, and two
would have a black majority. 57 The county rejected these alternative plans, and the
Department concluded "the county's rejection of the alternative plans was
motivated, in large part, by a desire to maintain districts conducive to the re-election
of incumbents and to limit the number of supervisor districts in which black voters
would have an equal opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice."' 58
In 1991, Castro County, Texas, adopted a plan that failed to establish even a

single district where Hispanic citizens of voting-age constituted a majority, despite
the fact that forty-six percent of the county was Hispanic (although a significant
proportion of the Hispanic community was made up of non-citizens). The county
rejected plans from its minority community that would have established one district
where Hispanics of voting-age were in the majority and offered no "nonracial
explanation for its failure to adopt a plan which include[d] at least one viable
Hispanic district."' 59 The Department objected to the plan, finding that the plan did

not meet preclearance requirements. 16 Despite the objection, Castro County used
the 1991 plan in a 1992 primary for two of the districts. The county then adopted
a new plan that actually decreased the Hispanic percentage in one of the districts

consultation with minority political leaders and with no effort to explain departures from normal
districting criteria. Analyzing the objection letters demonstrates that Reynolds applied the Section 5
purpose requirement to redistricting plans in a manner consistent with the case law. See also WOLTERS,
supra note 152, at 9-10.
156. See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990). Garza reinforced the
Department's interpretation of the purpose standard, as the appellate court upheld the district court's
finding that that county's redistricting plan, in which incumbents sought to assure their reelection at
the expense of minority voters, intentionally dilutive. Id. at 771.
157. Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to William E. Ready, County Attorney, Lauderdale County, Miss. (October 7, 1991).
158. Id. at 2. For similar purpose objections to county governing bodies, see Letter from John R.
Dunne, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Robert T. Bass, Esq.,
Allison & Assoc. (June 4, 1993) (objecting to redistricting plans in Cochran County, Texas, where
"concerns [were] raised about the nature and extent of minority participation in the county's
redistricting process"), Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Robert R. Horger, Esq., Horger, Barnwell & Reid (July 21, 1992) (objecting to a
redistricting plan in Orangeburg County, South Carolina, that "unnecessarily remove[d] black
population from existing District 5 in the process of reducing the district's population deviation");
Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to Virginia Daugherty, Esq., Daugherty & Assoc., McCulloch County, Tex. (Apr. 6, 1992) (objecting
to a McCulloch County, Texas redistricting plan where "the proposed plan will continue to deny
Hispanic voters an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice").
159. Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Bob Bass, Esq., Allison & Assoc. (Mar. 30, 1992).
160. Id. at 2.
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with a Hispanic majority and delayed elections for that district for two years,
triggering a second objection. 6'
C. Annexations and De-annexations

The purpose issue was at the core of the Department's objections to racially
selective annexation policies. 162 McClellanville, a predominantly white town in
Charleston County, South Carolina, sought to annex an area with mostly white
residents in 1974.163 The Department learned that largely black neighborhoods
adjacent to the town had expressed interest in annexation without success and,
concluding that this rejection was because of a racially discriminatory purpose,
denied preclearance to the submitted annexation."6 Since 1965, Grenada,
Mississippi, annexed a series of "exclusively white residential areas," but left black
neighborhoods in an area "immediately contiguous to the City... which is not part
of the city but which, as a result of the City's annexation activity .. .[was]

surrounded on three sides by the City of Grenada corporate boundaries."' 165 The
residents of the area expressed a desire to become part of the City of Grenada, and
a consulting firm retained by the city under a federal housing grant even
recommended annexing at least part of that black population concentration, "to no
avail."' 166 The Department objected, asserting, "Under Gomillion v. Lightfoot,....

a city can no more exclude black residents from the city by refusing to annex black
neighborhoods than it can exclude
black residents from the city by evicting or
167
deannexing its black voters."'

161. See Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Robert Bass, Esq. (Oct. 6, 1992). In 1993, Castro County adopted a third plan with
essentially the same characteristics, to which the Department once again objected on purpose grounds.
See Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Virginia Daugherty, Esq., Daugherty & Assoc. (May 10, 1993) (relying in part on Garza,
918 F.2d at 771). The county filed a Section 5 declaratory action, but the parties entered into settlement
negotiations in April 1994. Ultimately, the parties returned to court in a dispute over attorneys fees
arising from the Section 5 litigation. See Castro County v. Crespin, 101 F.3d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
162. Motomura, supra note 105, at 225-28.
163. Id. at 225.
164. See Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Phillip A. Middleton, Charleston County, S.C. (May 6, 1974). The Department withdrew
its objection "after the town (1)passed a resolution that it would consider future annexation petitions
without regard to race, and (2) agreed to inform the Department of Justice of any annexation petitions
from black areas adjacent to the town." Motomura, supra note 105, at 226 (citing Letter from J.
Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Phillip A.
Middleton, Charleston County, S.C. (Oct. 21, 1974)).
165. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to W.H. Fedric, City Attorney, Grenada, Miss. (Feb. 5, 1975).
166. Id. at 2.
167. Id. at 2. By citing Gomillion, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the Department seemed to rely on a
constitutional purpose standard. In March, the city submitted additional annexations of predominantly
white areas, and the Department again objected. See Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney
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Whites in seventy-seven percent black Lowndes County, Alabama, living in an
unincorporated area known as Hayneville, decided to incorporate as a new town a
few years after the Voting Rights Act eliminated barriers to black registration and
voting. 16 Hayneville residents drew the boundaries of the town in such a way as
to exclude most of the blacks residing in the unincorporated community.' 69 The

Department concluded that the change was objectionable, both because it was
retrogressive and because "the purpose of the incorporation was to reduce the
influence over Hayneville of the majority black Lowndes County electorate and to
prevent the possibility
of control of the Town of Hayneville by blacks residing
70
Town."'1
the
within
In 1980 the Department objected to annexations to the city of Pleasant Grove,
Alabama. 7 ' Because the city challenged the objection in court, the facts as to this
objection are well documented, and the law as to selective annexations is clear.

Pleasant Grove, a virtually all-white city near Birmingham, in industrial Jefferson
County, sought preclearance of a series of annexations. Its refusal to annex nearby
black population concentrations was part of what the trial court called "an

astounding pattern of racial exclusion and discrimination in all phases of Pleasant
Grove life."' 172 As a result, the city had remained "an all-white enclave in an

Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep' t of Justice, to W.H. Fedric, City Attorney, Grenada, Miss. (Feb. 5,
1975). The Department withdrew both objections on June 25, 1976, when the city agreed to annex the
previously excluded black neighborhoods.
168. Letter from Drew S.Days, Ell, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Frank H. Hawthorne, Attorney, Batch, Bingham, Baker, Hawthorne, Williams & Ward (Dec.
29, 1978) (relying on Beer v. United States; 425 U.S. 130 (1976); City of Richmond v. United States,
422 U.S. 358 (1975); and Gomillion). The Department also objected to the incorporation of the City
of Orange Grove in Harrison County, Mississippi, based on evidence that "racially invidious
considerations played a significant role both in the decision to create a new city and in determining
which areas and which people would be included within the proposed city and, by necessary extension,
which voters may participate in a referendum on incorporation." Letter from Drew S. Days, I1I,
Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Walter W. Teel, Esq., Sekul,
Hornsby, Wallace & Teel (June 2, 1980). Similarly, the Department objected on purpose grounds to
the creation of a new, predominantly white school district within the area governed by the Houston
Independent School District in Harris County, Texas. The new district was first proposed shortly after
elections in which "minority-backed candidates first gained control of the [existing] board," which was
under a court order "to undertake substantial school desegregation." Letter from J. Stanly Pottinger,
Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Joel B. Coolidge, President, Interim
Bd. of Tr., Proposed Westheimer Indep. Sch. Dist. (Jan. 13, 1977).
169. Objection Letter from Days to Teel, supra note 168, at 2.
170. Id.
171. See Letter from Drew S. Days m11,Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Thomas Crawford, Jr., Esq., Cooper, Mitch & Crawford (Feb. 1, 1980).
172. City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 1455, 1456 (D.D.C. 1983) (denying
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment); see also City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 623 F.
Supp. 782, 784, 787-88 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 479 U.S. 462 (1987) (denying preclearance of the
annexations).
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otherwise racially mixed area of Alabama."' 73 The annexations at issue17provided
annexation policy. 4

further evidence of racial discrimination in the city's
The city claimed that there could be no retrogressive effect to its annexation
policies because there were no black people in the city, and thus "the annexations
did not reduce the proportion of black voters or deny existing black voters
175
representation equivalent to their political strength in the enlarged community."'
A majority of the Supreme Court rejected this view, pointing out, "Section 5 looks
not only to the present effects of changes, but to their future effects as well."' 76 The
Court added that the purpose requirement also applied to "anticipated as well as
present circumstances."'' 77 At the district court level, the city argued that proof of

discriminatory intent without proof of discriminatory effect was insufficient to deny
preclearance, but the trial court gave short shrift to that argument. 7 8 The Supreme
Court agreed: "'Congress plainly intended that a voting practice not be precleared
unless both discriminatory purpose and effect are absent."" 79

Pleasant Grove also argued that the purpose requirement of Section 5 was
limited to retrogressive intent. Dissenting, Justice Lewis Powell, joined by Chief

Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, agreed: "[F]or a city
to have a discriminatory purpose within the meaning of the Voting Rights Act, it
must intend its action to have a retrogressive effect on the voting rights of
blacks."'"8 The majority, however, observed that it had rejected such reasoning
since City ofRichmond. '' In City ofRichmond, the Court ruled a change motivated

by a racially discriminatory purpose "'has no legitimacy at all under our
173. City of PleasantGrove, 568 F. Supp. at 1456.

174. The Supreme Court noted that the evidence of intentional discrimination was so strong, that
"even if the burden of proving discrimination was on the United States, the [trial] court 'would have
had no difficulty in finding that the annexation policy of Pleasant Grove is, by design, raciallydiscriminatory in violation of the Voting Rights Act."' City of PleasantGrove, 479 U.S. at 467 n.7
(quoting City of PleasantGrove, 623 F. Supp. at 788 n.30).

175. Id. at 470-71. The dissenters also adopted this view. Id. at 475-76 (Powell, J., dissenting);
see also THERNSTROM, supra note 13, at 156 ("It is difficult to see how black voting rights had been
abridged by the boundary change, since Pleasant Grove had no black voters to begin with.").
176. City of PleasantGrove, 479 U.S. at 471.
177. Id. The dissent by Justice Powell rejected this interpretation as "purely speculative." Id. at
472 (Powell, J., dissenting).
178. See City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 623 F. Supp. 782, 788 (D.D.C. 1985) ("[T]he
city has wholly failed to carry its burden of establishing that its annexation policy does not have the
purpose of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color."); City of Pleasant Grove
v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 1455, at 1460 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding that annexations are not entitled
to preclearance "if there is a discriminatory purpose irrespective of whether or not there is also a
discriminatory effect").
179. City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 469 (1987) (quoting City of Rome
v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172 (1980)).
180. Id. at 474 (Powell, J., dissenting). For this proposition, Justice Powell relied on his majority
opinion in City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 134 (1983) (discussing Beer v. United

States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)), although discriminatory purpose was not an issue in either Beer or
Lockhart.

181. Id. at 471 n. 11 (majority opinion).
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Constitution2 or under the statute.., whatever its actualeffect may have been or
18
may be.'

In the late 1990s, the city of Lamesa, Texas, where Hispanics and African
Americans together formed fifty-one percent of the population, de-annexed an area
only a year after initially bringing it into the city.'83 White residents of a particular
election district, the placement site of the area's new low and moderate income
housing development, mounted a major effort to block the arrival of "undesirables,"
"HUD people," and "Section 8 people," who would allegedly bring "criminal

activity" to their neighborhood. 84 Because the city bowed to this pressure and deannexed the development, the Department objected on purpose grounds.' 85
XI. THE SPECIAL CASE OF ADDITIONAL JUDGESHIPS

In the 1980s, the Department objected to numerous additional judicial posts
created to deal with expanding caseloads, but which employed election procedures
that had the potential for diluting minority voting strength. The voting change
present in each instance was an increase in the number of judges in multi-judge
jurisdictions (variously called districts or circuits). 186 In each instance, the
Department examined the increase in judgeships in the context of the method of
election used to elect the judges-almost invariably at-large
election accompanied
87
by designated post and majority vote requirements.

In some instances, however, one or more of these enhancing devices was itself
a covered voting change. The first instance arose when a three-judge court in North
Carolina enjoined further use of the method of electing certain state trial court

judges until the state obtained preclearance. 8 8 North Carolina elected its superior
court judges under numbered seat and staggered term requirements that were not

182. Id. (quoting City of Richmond, 422 U.S. 358 at 378-79 (1975)) (emphasis added).
183. Letter from Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assoc. Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Robert Gorsline, City Sec'y, Lamesa, Tex. (July 16, 1999).
184. Id. at 3.
185. Id.
186. The Department followed the reasoning in Haith v. Martin, 618 F. Supp. 410, 412-13
(E.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901 (1986). In a later decision, Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646
(1991), the Supreme Court cited to Haith, where "[it] issued a summary affirmance of a decision
holding that § 5 applied to judges," as evidence that the election of judges was, in fact, covered by
Section 5. Id. at 653 (citing Haith, 477 U.S. at 901). The Department was also so instructed. See
Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 775 F. Supp. 1470, 1475 (S.D. Ga. 1989) aff'd mem., 498 U.S. 916
(1990). ("The Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Haith v. Martin may well have decided this
issue.").
187. Here the Department followed the approach indicated by City of Lockhart v. United States,
460 U.S. 125, 131-32 (1983) ("The possible discriminatory purpose or effect of the new seats,
admittedly subject to § 5, cannot be determined in isolation from the 'preexisting' elements of the
council. Similarly, the numbered post system is an integral part of the new election plan."); see also
McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 255 n.27 (1984) (citing the above passage from City of Lockhart).
188. Haith,618 F. Supp. at 414. None of the judgeships had been submitted for Section 5 review.
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adopted until after the adoption of the Voting Rights Act and had never been

submitted for preclearance. 9 As the Department explained, the use of numbered
posts for judges "precludes minority voters from effective use of... single-shot
voting" and thus "plainly has a retrogressive effect." 9 '

A three-judge court in Mississippi subsequently ordered the submission of
twenty-four multi-judge state circuit and chancery court judgeships for Section 5
review. 91 In the Department's view, "[t]he change from single-judge to multi-judge
districts-in the context of racial bloc voting and the precluded anti-single-shot
feature-strongly suggest[ed] a retrogressive effect in black voting strength." '92 A
key factual assumption underlying the Department's view, which subsequently
proved to be incorrect, 93 was that "[a]t the time that the state came under Section
5 coverage, there was no state constitutional provision or general legislation that
required the use of an at-large/numbered place system in multi-judge' 9judicial
4
districts, and the state has not subsequently enacted any such provision." 1

Mississippi sought alternative preclearance by filing a declaratory judgment
action in the District of Columbia. 9' The evidence presented demonstrated that in
Mississippi "there have never been multi-judge district elections without numbered
posts." 916 The voting changes at issue thus could not be retrogressive because "there
was no opportunity for single-shot voting prior to 1964."' ' The court granted the
Department's motion for further discovery on the purpose issue. 198 In the meantime,
a federal court in Mississippi found that the use of at-large elections and designated
posts in various multi-judge chancery and circuit court districts violated Section 2

189. See id. at 411 (stating as undisputed fact that before the Section 5 coverage date, November
1, 1964, "candidates for the office of superior court judge in judicial districts having more than one
judge were not required to announce for which vacancy he or she was filing nor did any district have
staggered terms for judges within the district"). The designated post and staggered term provisions
provided by the North Carolina statutes under Section 5 review, in short, required preclearance.
190. Letter from Win. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Alex K. Brock, Executive Sec'y-Dir., N.C. State Bd. of Elections (Apr. 11, 1986).
191. Kirksey v. Allain, 635 F. Supp. 347, 349-50 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
192. Letter from Win. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Stephen J. Kirchmayr, Deputy Attorney Gen., Miss. (July 1, 1986). In a subsequent letter
denying the state's request for reconsideration, Assistant Attorney General W. Bradford Reynolds
explained the Department's initial decision in greater detail and pointed out that the recent decision in
Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D. Miss. 1987), included findings that reinforced the conclusion
that the additional judgeships at issue would have a retrogressive effect. See Letter from Win. Bradford
Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Right Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Stephen J. Kirchmayr,
Deputy Attorney Gen., Miss. (Sept. 8, 1987).
193. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
194. Letter from Win. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Stephen J. Kirchmayr, Deputy Attorney Gen., Miss. (July 1, 1986).
195. Mississippi v. United States, No. 87-3464, 1988 WL 90056 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1988).
196. Id. at *4.
197. Id.
198. Id. at *6.
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of the Voting Rights Act199 and set a hearing date to determine the proper remedies,
which could include the creation of single-judge sub-districts.2 °0
In Clark v. Edwards,20 1 a Louisiana federal court found that the method of
electing various judicial posts at-large, by numbered posts, and with a runoff
requirement violated Section 2 of the Act. This decision, in turn, led the
Department to object to the creation of numerous judgeships. Based in part on the
findings in Clark, the Department took the position that, in addition to the fact that
the changes were retrogressive, they also presented a clear violation of Section 2.202
The state adopted a new plan to remedy the Section 2 violations identified in Clark
by, among other things, creating additional judgeships elected at-large and by
designated post; the Department again refused preclearance, this time basing its
objection on the purpose requirement of Section 5.203

An objection to the addition of numerous trial court judgeships in Georgia also
relied on the purpose prong in Section 5. Now that the courts had made clear that
the creation of additional judgeships required Section 5 review, the state grudgingly
submitted forty-eight superior court judgeships established since 1965. When the
state refused to provide the detailed information the Department requested, the

Department interposed a technical objection on June 16, 1989.204 The trial court in
Brooks v. State Board of Elections2

5

ordered the state to supply the requested

information, endorsing the Department's view that the addition of judgeships must

199. Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183, at 1204 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
200. Id. at 1205; see also Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327,332 (S.D. Miss. 1988) ("The Court
therefore finds that having single-member sub-districts... is the most plausible remedy for the Section
2 violation.").
201. 725 F. Supp. 285, 302 (M.D. La. 1988).
202. Letter from Win. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Kenneth C. Delean, Chief Counsel, La. (Sept. 23, 1988). A second objection did not
specifically refer to retrogression and clearly relied more heavily on the court's Section 2 findings.
Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to Kenneth C. Dejean, Chief Counsel, La. (May 12, 1989).
203. Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Cynthia Y. Rougeou, Assistant Attorney Gen., La. (Sept. 17, 1990). Of course, the
Department continued to rely on the fact that the changes would violate Section 2. Two additional
objections to new judicial posts were based on both purpose and Section 2 as well. See Letter from John
R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Angie R. LaPlace,
Assistant Attorney Gen., La. (Sept. 20, 1991); Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Cynthia Young Rougeau, Assistant Attorney Gen., La. (Nov.
20, 1990).
204. See Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Carol Atha Cosgrove, Senior Assistant Attorney Gen., Ga. (June 16, 1989).
205. 775 F. Supp. 1470 (S.D. Ga. 1989).
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be viewed "in the context of an existing electoral scheme."2 °6 The state complied,

submitting an additional ten judgeships. The Department objected to all fifty-eight
judges, as they were elected under an at-large system enhanced by numbered posts
and a majority vote requirement. 7
The purpose prong of Section 5 was also the basis for four objections to
additional trial court judgeships in Texas, where judges were elected at-large, by
designated post, and pursuant to a majority vote requirement. In each instance the
Department noted that numerous federal courts-dealing with legislative rather than
judicial offices-had found these election methods racially discriminatory in
purpose, effect, or both. Objection letters cited recent legislative hearings in which
the method of electing judges was debated, and noted that the hearings revealed a
common understanding in Texas that at-large elections, numbered places, and
runoffs typically diluted minority voting strength, and that alternative election
procedures would permit African American and Latino voters greater opportunity

to elect judicial candidates of their choice.

8

206. Id. at 1479. The Brooks court added:
Preclearance occurs only in the context of an existing electoral scheme; the
number of judges elected within a particular circuit constitutes part of that
scheme. If adding new judicial posts, even where candidates will be elected
according to precleared voting procedures, has "a potential for discrimination,"
then such an addition would be a covered "enactment" under Section 5.
Id. (quoting Dougherty County v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 42 (1978)). The court in Georgia v. Reno, 881
F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 1995), which ultimately precleared all the judgeships at issue, rejected this
reasoning, focusing only on the decision to add judges and ignoring the method of electing them.
207. See Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Michael J. Bowers, Attorney Gen., Ga. (Apr. 25, 1990). Although enacted in June, 1964,
and thus not covered by Section 5, the statewide runoff and numbered place provisions were adopted
with a discriminatory purpose, according to information developed by the Department and by the
minority plaintiffs in connection with a Section 2 challenge to the statewide majority vote requirement.
Brooks v. Harris, No. Civ. 90-1001-RCF (N.D. Ga.). By continuously expanding use of these devices
every time a new judgeship was created-when alternative methods of electing superior court judges
could be enacted by statute-the Department saw Georgia as acting with discriminatory intent. For a
detailed account of the historical evidence of discriminatory intent in the adoption of the majority vote
requirement, see J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE
UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 197-242, 484-87 (1999).
208. See Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Ronlad Kirk, Sec'y of State, Tex. (Aug. 15, 1994); Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant
Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Ronald Kirk, Sec'y of State, Tex. (May 31,
1994); Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to John Hannah, Jr., Sec'y of State, Tex. (May 9, 1994); Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney
Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Tom Harrison, Special Assistant for Elections, Tex.
Elections Div. (Nov. 5, 1990). The judgeships at issue in the 1990 decision were ruled untimely (and
thus the court effectively precleared changes) in Mexican American Bar Ass'n v. Texas, 755 F. Supp.
735 (W.D. Tex. 1990). The judgeships at issue in the 1994 decisions were precleared in an unreported
two-page per curiam opinion, Texas v. United States, No. 94-1529, 1995 WL 769160 (D.D.C. July 10,
1995).
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XII. THE IMPACT OF THE SECTION 2 RESULTS TEST

The relationship between the elimination of at-large elections and changes in

minority representation in the southern states covered by the Act's preclearance
requirement has been the focus of substantial empirical research. The central
pattern observed is that the replacement of at-large systems by fairly drawn singlemember district plans dramatically increased African American representation.2"9

The trend was almost as dramatic in jurisdictions that switched from at-large
elections to mixed plans including a few at-large seats, except that minority
candidates rarely won at-large.21 ° In many cases the level of black representation

in 1989 approximated the black percentage of the population in the jurisdiction.2 1'
Very few African Americans were elected to council seats from white-majority
districts.2 12 On the other hand, virtually all black-majority districts elected black
council members.213
The research results on black representation are not surprising to those familiar

with the evidence of racial polarization produced in the hundreds of vote-dilution

209. See Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson, The Effect of MunicipalElection Structure on
Black Representationin Eight Southern States, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 306.
210. See id. at 307.
211. See id. at 309. Many of the state case studies in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 2, present
data on cities smaller than 10,000 in population, and some present findings regarding county governing
bodies or school boards as well as municipal governments. Similar patterns result regardless of the type
of jurisdictions involved. For similar studies presenting comparable findings, see Theodore S.
Arrington and Thomas G. Watts, The Election of Blacks to School Boards in North Carolina,44 W.
POL. Q. 1099 (1991), and Charles S. Bullock, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, DistrictingFormats,
and the Election of African Americans, 56 J. OF POL. 1098 (1994).
212. Grofman & Davidson, supra note 209, at 309.
213. Id. at 310-11. These findings confirm the conventional view among political scientists that
at-large elections serve as a significant barrier to minority representation. See, e.g., PEGGY HEILIG &
ROBERT J. MUNDT, YOUR VOICE AT CITY HALL: THE POLITICS, PROCEDURES AND POLICIES OF DISTRICT
REPRESENTATION (1984) (examining whether recent structural shifts to district elections have, in fact,
had consequences for local politics, procedures and policy); ALBERT K. KARNIG AND SUSAN WELCH,
BLACK REPRESENTATION AND URBAN POLICY (1980) (examining black political power, public office,
and urban policy); Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority-Group
Representation: A Re-Examination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence, 43 J. OF POL. 982
(1981) (examining the history and present effects of at-large or multi-member district elections in the
context of modern local governments); Richard L. Engstrom & Michael D. McDonald, The Election
ofBlacks to City Councils: Clarifyingthe Impact of ElectoralArrangements on the Seats/Population
Relationship, 75 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 344 (1981) (addressing the question "whether electoral
arrangements or socioeconomic factors are the major influence on how proportionately blacks are
represented"); Clinton B. Jones, The Impact of Local Election Systems on Black Political
Participation, 11 URBAN AFF. Q. 345 (1976) (suggesting election reforms to increase black
representation on city councils); Albert K. Karnig, Black Representationon City Councils: The Impact
of District Elections and Socioeconomic Factors, 12 URB. AFF. Q. 223 (1976) (suggesting that
socioeconomic factors are the principle factors in black representation); and Margaret K. Latimer,
Black PoliticalRepresentation in Southern Cities: Election Systems and Other Causal Variables, 15
URB. AFF. Q. 65 (1979) (discussing the interplay of election systems and black political inactivity in
the South).
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lawsuits tried or settled in the last quarter century. No court has ever found a

violation in a vote-dilution case absent proof, typically presented through expert
statistical analysis, that white voters routinely defeat the minority voters' candidates
of choice.2" 4 This trend of reliance on expert testimony continues to the present.2"
In such a context, the only way to provide minority voters with a fair opportunity
to elect their preferred representatives is to order a change to district elections or
some alternative remedy.
By 1990, there were far fewer at-large systems left in the South. Those
remaining were sometimes in jurisdictions where white cross-over voting had
resulted in a pattern
of significant minority representation, thus making litigation
16
unnecessary.
Recent research indicates that at-large elections still tend to deter the election
of minority candidates.2" 7 In district election plans, recent studies indicate that
majority-minority districts continue to provide the optimal opportunity to elect
candidates who are members of racial minority groups to public office but that,
depending on the political circumstances in the jurisdiction, it may be possible to

214. For assessments of the evidence presented in expert testimony, see Bernard Grofman, Expert
Witness Testimony and the Evolution of Voting Rights Case Law, in CONTROVERSIES, supra note 2,
197-229; McCrary, Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 82, at 509-11, 514, 517-19, 521. For a
contrary view, see THERNSTROM, supra note 13, at 243 ("[tihe majority-white county, city, or district
in which whites vote as a solid bloc against any minority candidate is now unusual."). When
Thernstrom discusses the evidence of racially polarized voting presented in vote-dilution lawsuits, she
often gets the facts wrong. See, e.g., Karlan & McCrary, supra note 45, at 759 n.53 (demonstrating
the factual errors in her discussion of the findings in Thornburg v. Gingles).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Charleston County, 316 F. Supp. 2d 268 (D.S.C. 2003), aff'd, 365
F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2004) (relying on expert testimony to conclude the use of at-large elections violated
Section 2); Colleton County Council v. McConnell, 201 F. Supp. 2d 618 (D.S.C. 2002) (appointing "a
technical advisor to assist the court in understanding and utilizing the relevant technology needed to
issue an order in the requisite time frame").
216. At first glance, Susan Welch, The Impact of At-Large Elections on the Representationof
Blacks and Hispanics, 52 J. OF POL. 1050 (1990), appears to contradict this pattern. Welch's study
concluded that "the cities with the greatest underrepresentation of blacks have been the ones to shift
representational structures." Id. at 1073. Welch's sample of cities seems, however, to reflect aselection
bias, as her study is "based on a survey of every U.S. city which had a 1984 population of at least 50
thousand and.., a minimum of 5% black population in 1980." Id. at 1053. Particularly in the South,
many at-large systems that had diluted minc.ity voting strength in the past have, in many cases as a
result of litigation, now shifted to single-member districts or mixed plans. See Davidson & Grofman,
The Effect of MunicipalElection Structureon Black Representationin Eight Southern States, in QUIET
REVOLUTION, supranote 2, at 320-21. Other studies show a continuing pattern of substantially lower
minority representation in at-large systems. See Charles S. Bullock M & Susan A. MacManus, Testing
Assumptions of the Totality-of-the Circumstances Test: An Analysis of the Impact of Structures on
Black DescriptiveRepresentation,21 AMER. POL. Q. 290, 295 (1993); Timothy R. Sass & Stephen L.
Mehay, The Voting Rights Act, DistrictElections, and the Success of Black Candidatesin Municipal
Elections, 38 J. L. & ECON. 367, 368 (1995); Jeffrey S. Zax, Election Methods and Black and Hispanic
City Council Membership, 71 Soc. SCI. Q. 339, 354 (1990).
217. Tim R. Sass & Bobby J.Pittman, Jr., The Changing Impact of ElectoralStructureon Black
Representation in the South, 1970-1996, 104 PUB. CHOICE 369, 386 (2000).
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elect African American candidates, and on some occasions Hispanic candidates
with between forty and fifty percent of the voting age population.2 18
XI.

THE CHANGING LEGAL BASIS OF SECTION 5 OBJECTIONS

The Department of Justice has, from the start, precleared the vast majority of
voting changes submitted under Section 5. Its power to object to proposed changes
has, however, provided substantial protection to minority voters over the years.
Understanding the Department's exercise of its power is key to any assessment of
the implementation of Section 5.219

The most striking pattern in the Department's objection decisions is the
consistent increase over time of objections based on the purpose prong of Section
5, and the consistent decline of objections based on retrogression.22 ° During the
1970s the Department rarely cited intent in its objection letters. The Department
based only nine objections (just two percent) entirely on purpose. The Department
based the vast majority of the objections (297, or seventy-seven percent) on
retrogression. 2 1 By the 1980s, the Department based eighty-three objections
(twenty-five percent) entirely on the intent requirement and only 146 objections
(forty-four percent) on the retrogression standard alone. A new basis for objecting
was available in the 1980s, when it was possible to object because the proposed
change presented a clear violation of the new Section 2 results test. 222 However, the

Department only interposed two objections on this basis alone in the 1980s. In the
218. For the most comprehensive analysis of this issue, see Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, &
David Lublin, Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A ConceptualFramework and Some Empirical
Evidence, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1383, 1395-1403 (2001). For another good analysis, see JOSHUA G. BEHR,
RACE, ETHNICITY, AND THE POLITICS OF CITY REDISTRICTING: MINORITY-OPPORTUNITY DISTRICTS
AND THE ELECTION OF HISPANICS AND BLACKS TO CITY COuNCILs 4, 103-06 (2004).
219. The analysis of the Department's objection decisions in the following paragraphs is based
on a forthcoming empirical study: McCrary et al., End of Preclearance,supra note 65. In this study
the authors examined all objection decisions between 1965 and 2004 (as conveyed to covered
jurisdictions in 1,037 letters), and coded them as to the legal basis or bases for the objection.
220. See McCrary et al., End of Preclearance,supra note 65, app. tbl.1.
221. A small number fell into the category of a technical objection, where the jurisdiction failed
to supply the information the Department's guidelines required, making a proper assessment of the
change impossible. Although always small in number, technical objections were more common in the
1970s (five percent) than in the 1980s (four percent), and disappeared altogether by the 1990s. The
need to apply a consistent coding scheme for all letters between 1968 and 1999 necessitated treating
all changes as retrogressive if they satisfied the Beer standard. Where the letter referred to the dilutive
effect of a change that did not make matters worse for minority voters, the study classified the change
as dilutive. There were only thirty-four such non-retrogressive but dilutive plans, nine percent of the
redistricting objections in the 1970s.
222. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 12 n.31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 189 ("In
light of the amendment to section 2, it is intended that a section 5 objection also follow if a new voting
procedure itself so discriminates as to violate section 2."); see also Procedures for the Administration
of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as Amended, 52 Fed. Reg. 490 (Jan. 6, 1987) (codified
at 28 C.F.R. § 51.55) (withholding preclearance where "a bar to implementation of the change is
necessary to prevent a clear violation of amended Section 2.").
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1990s, the Department objected on purpose alone in 151 instances (forty-three
percent). Retrogression alone was the basis for only seventy-three objections
(twenty-one percent), and only six objections relied entirely on Section 2.
Objections to redistricting plans followed a similar pattern. Objections based on
purpose alone increased from seven (eleven percent) in the 1970s to seventy-five
(forty-four percent) during the next decade, and 112 (fifty-eight percent) in the
1990s. Retrogression alone was the basis for thirty-seven redistricting objections
(forty percent) in the 1970s, thirty-five objections (twenty-one percent) in the 1980s,
and twenty objections (ten percent) in the 1990s. Section
2 concerns provided the
223
1990s.
in
objection
redistricting
one
only
for
basis
XIV.

REVERSAL IN THE COURTS

In a series of redistricting decisions, beginning with a 1993 case, Shaw v.
Reno, 224 a new 5-4 conservative majority on the United States Supreme Court

invalidated majority-black or majority-Hispanic congressional districts in several
Southern states under a new constitutional standard thus far applied only to the
creation of majority-minority districts. 225 Although these were not Section 5 cases,
the Court took pains to criticize the Department's implementation of the

preclearance requirements of the Act and, in particular, its view of the Section 5
purpose prong.
In striking down a Georgia congressional redistricting plan, the Court stated
that race had been "the predominant factor motivating the legislature" in drawing
district lines. 26 As the Court saw it, Georgia had succumbed to improper pressure

from the Department of Justice, which, in reviewing redistricting plans in the 1990s,
had converted the Section 5 purpose standard into a policy of requiring covered

223. The principal difference between redistricting objections and objections as a whole was that
a substantially lower proportion of redistricting objections were based on retrogression than was case
for objections as a whole. McCrary et al., End of Preclearance,supra note 65, app. tbls.2, 3.
224. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
225. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (applying strict scrutiny to determine Texas's
redistricting attempts in three districts unconstitutional and "not justified by a compelling state
interest"); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (holding a North Carolina redistricting plan in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause "because the state's reapportionment scheme is not narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest"); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (holding Georgia's
congressional redistricting plan violates the Equal Protection Clause). The same conservative majority
also upheld a court-drawn congressional plan in Georgia that decreased the number of black-majority
districts from three to one. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997). The Court rejected white
plaintiffs' racial gerrymandering claim and upheld one congressional plan in North Carolina, however,
in Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 237 (2001). See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, RACE AND
REDISTRICTING: THE SHAW-CROMARTIE CASES

3 (2002) ("[T]his book chronicles the politics of

majority-minority districting in North Carolina, Shaw-Cromartie'sjourney through the courts, [and]
the cases' significant impact on election law .... ").
226. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 ("[T]he legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting
principles.., to racial considerations.").
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jurisdictions to "maximize" minority voting strength by creating as many majorityminority districts as possible, no matter what the cost to traditional districting
principles.227 The Court reiterated this view a year later in its decision striking
down North Carolina's congressional redistricting plan in Shaw v. Hunt.22 What
drove judicial criticism of the Department's Section 5 policy in the 1990s, it seems,
was the way the Department interpreted factual evidence when applying the purpose
standard.
The vehicle by which the Court transformed Section 5 policy proved to be its
handling of a declaratory judgement action initiated by the school board in Bossier
Parish, Louisiana. On January 24, 2000, the Supreme Court, by a narrow 5-4

majority, fundamentally redefined-and weakened-the concept of discriminatory
intent under Section 5 in Reno v. Bossier ParishSchool Board (Bossier Parish
1/).229 Under the new standard, a voting change with an unconstitutional racial
purpose, no matter how strong the evidence of discriminatory intent, would require
preclearance unless the evidence also showed that the change was intended to make
matters worse for minority voters than under the status quo-which the Court
termed "retrogressive intent. ' 230 In the guise of making the definition of purpose
under Section 5 congruent with the definition of retrogressive effect, the decision
effectively minimized use of Section 5 as a weapon for protecting minority voters
from discrimination.
The impact of the Supreme Court's decision in BossierParishIHwas dramatic,
as measured by the number of objections interposed by the Department in its wake.
Between the Court's decision on January 24, 2000, and June 25, 2004, the

Department interposed only forty-one objections, as compared with 250 objections
during a comparable period a decade earlier. 3 Moreover, the Department based

227. Id. at 924-25 ("Instead of grounding its objections on evidence of adiscriminatory purpose,
it would appear the Government was driven by its policy of maximizing majority-black districts.").
The Court noted that the Justice Department "disavows having had that policy," and that it "seems to
concede its impropriety." Id. The majority opinion nevertheless relied on "the District Court's welldocumented factual finding." Id. at 925. The District Court opinion is found at Johnson v. Miller, 864
F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
228. 517 U.S. 899, 913 (1996) ("It appears that the Justice Department was pursuing in North
Carolina the same policy of maximizing the number of majority-black districts that it pursued in
Georgia.").
229. 528 U.S. 320 (2000). The Court's initial opinion struck down the Department's "clear
violation of Section 2" test but remanded to the lower court certain questions regarding the purpose
prong of Section 5 that were ultimately resolved in Bossier II. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier
Parish1), 520 U.S. 471,476-77,483,490 (1997).
230. Bossier ParishII, 528 U.S. at 326; see also id. at 341 ("In light of the language of § 5 and
our prior holding in Beer, we hold that § 5 does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted
with a discriminatory but non-retrogressive purpose.")
231. I am not arguing that there would likely have been 250 objections after January 2000 had
Bossier ParishII not eliminated the long-standing Section 5 purpose standard. Doubtless the number
of potentially objectionable changes would have been somewhat lower than in the 1990s due to changed
political circumstances. Where the Democratic Party controlled the legislature, the increased role of
minority officeholders in the decision-making process in covered jurisdictions due to earlier successes
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virtually all of these objections on a finding of retrogressive effect; at most, two of
the forty-one objections were based entirely on the elusive concept of retrogressive
intent.
XV. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN IMPLEMENTING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

The reasons for the success of the Voting Rights Act are easily summarized.
First, the statute explicitly gave great authority to the federal courts-and to the
Department of Justice acting as a surrogate for the courts-to enforce its provisions.
Second, these provisions were straightforward and easily implemented, requiring
only changes in voter registration procedures, the conduct of balloting, or the
method of election in the affected jurisdictions (all already precisely regulated by
state law or local ordinance). Third, for the most part, the courts enforced the Act
vigorously along the lines defined by a supportive Supreme Court, even though
these complex, fact-intensive lawsuits came to require great quantities of time and
effort, often by three-judge panels rather than a simple trial court. Fourth, Congress
proved consistently supportive of expanding minority voting rights, endorsing the
prohibition on minority vote dilution in 1970, expanding coverage to language
minorities in 1975, and establishing a clear statutory results test in 1982.
Congressional support reflected the general public acceptance of minority voting
rights, where remedies did not require whites (except perhaps incumbent
officeholders) to give up individual benefits. Finally, once remedies were in
place-typically single-member district plans that gave minority voters a reasonably
good chance of electing candidates of their choice (usually at less than their
proportion of the voting-age population)-the Court required no further monitoring.
The impact of judicial implementation depends, of course, on the efficacy of
the remedies typically ordered by the courts. In the case of voting rights, the
success of the Act in the South is usually measured in increased black voter
participation and representation. Because racially polarized voting has consistently
been the norm in the South, large or white-majority districts rarely elected black
voters, but blacks were typically able to win in black-majority districts drawn to
satisfy the Voting Rights Act. Once serving in the governing body or in the
legislature, however, minority officeholders were successful only to the degree that
they were able to participate in winning coalitions, reshaping the agenda to better
meet the needs of their constituents. These goals are beyond the scope of the
remedies possible under the Act.
Ultimately the continued effectiveness of civil rights policies depends upon the
degree to which the case law supports vigorous enforcement. The Supreme Court's
opinions in the so-called "racial gerrymandering" or Shaw cases, and its decision
in enforcing the Voting Rights Act might have occasioned fewer objectionable changes. On the other
hand, black elected officials would likely have had little influence in Republican-controlled legislatures.
That said, the gap between forty and 250 is substantial, and likely cannot be explained by these other
changes alone.
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in Bossier Parish II have eroded confidence in the future of minority voting
rights. 232 This erosion of confidence is one of the unfortunate consequences of
policy implementation through the judicial process.
XVI. CONCLUSION

In sum, the enormous increase in minority electoral participation and
representation in the South since 1965 is directly attributable to the effective
implementation of the Voting Rights Act. Its success stems from the power given
to the courts and to the Department of Justice to conduct searching inquiries into the
relationship between race and voter choice at the local and state level, and to assure
through legally enforceable decisions that minority voters compete with the majority
on a level playing field. Those critics who lament the Act as an unwarrantable
intrusion into the political process are now beginning to be quoted approvingly in
court decisions hostile to minority voting rights. The critics are right in saying that
the Act is intrusive. In light of the continued level of racially polarized voting in
most areas of the South, alas, the historical record fails to indicate whether fair
elections could have been achieved in the South without it.

232. See Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy AfterAll These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era,
26 CUMB. L. REV. 287,289-300, 310-11(1995-96); McCrary et al., End of Preclearance,supranote
65; Laughlin McDonald, The Counterrevolutionin Minority Voting Rights, 65 MIss. L. J. 271,273-74
(1995).
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